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ABSTIL\CT
The increasing psychologisation of domestic viol,ence in the past 25 years is an example of what
Rose (1985) terms the 'psychological-complex'. The psy-complex rests on a particular
understanding of the subject of psychology. The subject is the unitary, rational and psychological
being. This understanding of subjectivity is gendered as it identifies women as responsible for the
transferal of the psy-complex to the family. The psy-complex is analysed as a form of power
resting on this gendered subjectivity. It is also analysed as a form of power that has escaped
feminist scrutiny due to the feminist assumptions. that power is repressive and prohibitive.
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PREFACE
Unless specifically indicated to the contrary, this project is the result of my own work.
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A JOURNEY TO FEMINIST POSTSTRUCTURALISM
This thesis reflects my personal travels through the vast literature on domestic violence and
the ways in which it has influenced my work and interest in the area. My interest in domestic
violence began as an undergraduate student when I started to facilitate support groups for
women who were victims of abuse at the local Family and Marriage Society. As I began to
work my way through the literature, I found it intellectually stimulating but devoid of much
practical usefulness. I was aware that my repeated attempts to bring what I had learned to the
women in the group were met, usually with blank stares, and occasionally with outright
disbelief. It seemed that the theory on domestic violence existed at a level of abstraction far
removed from the everyday lives and experiences of these women. They had no need for, nor
grasp of, concepts such as 'locus of control' or 'thought stopping'. Terminology of this kind
did not change their everyday lived realities. For all the personal growth that may have
occurred through the use of such concepts, the entire structure and organisation of our society
seemed to work against them achieving freedorn and safety. I began to get a feeling of living a
dual existence. Debates around theories and aetiologies of domestic violence existed within
the realm of my academics. The real 'work' in the area was with the women who entered the
support groups and seemingly had no need for such theories. This experience lay in stark
contrast to many of the claims by theorists to have developed down to earth, easily
implementable theory.
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But every cloud does have a silver lining it would seem. Browsing through the library, I stumbled
across a book, entitled Domestic violence: A Profeminist Analysis (YHo and Bograd, 1988). It
focused on feminist responses to traditional theories of domestic violence. The suggestions they
proposed were ones that I could share with the women with whom I worked. They were practical
and implementable and the critiques of existing theories were ones that I could clearly identify
with. The focus for women was in changing our patriarchal society in order that women enjoy the
freedom and privileges that men had enjoyed for so long. All this time I had misguidedly looked
inside of myself and other women to try to understand domestic violence. Now I realised that we
must focus on the power of men, the law, the state and how it maintains patriarchy. We must
lobby for change, demand that attention be given to women's issues, critique the ideas and
theories of men and the ways that they represent rnen's interests, and hold men responsible for
their actions that subordinate women in every aspect of their lives. The theory matched the
outrage that women were feeling at being continually ignored by psychological theory or treated
as 'other': that which is not male. I became caught up in this wave of activity. Women were
united and working for a mutual goal. We were political activists working for a common struggle
against a common enemy that was clearly defined and identifiable. There was unity and
sisterhood, and old theories were rejected in favour of practice. The passion and dedication was
invigorating.
Slowly in this country, laws have changed. Those with legal power have become aware of
domestic violence and policies have become increasingly gender sensitive. The solution to
domestic violence seems, however, to remain maddeningly distant. Again, it appears that these
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legal changes do not affect the everyday lived experiences of women. The changes advocated for
by feminism did not seem to have much of an impact on the relationships and values of women
or their husbands. In addition, I became distinctly aware of the divisions and rifts within
feminism and realised the alienated feeling of being accused of not being a real feminist if I did
not agree with everything that was being advocated for. I began to wonder whether I had the right
to identify myself as a feminist as it seemed that I qualified as one only occasionally. An article
by Erickson (1992) reflected succinctly the feelings I had. She relates certain feminist approaches
to a particular religious fundamentalist who "continued to exalt comrades in his faith and warn of
damnation for dissenters" (p. 263). Was I so overcome by false consciousness that I could not
recognise the truth in these feminist theories? I began to ask how a feminism for women could
exclude some women on the grounds that they w~~re letting down the side? Which side were we
on and \vho were our team captains? Did we even elect these captains? Amid this sea of
conflicting theory and competing calls for action among the branches of feminism, my study of
psychology (the psychology of another species it would seem) continued.
My introduction to poststructuralist theory, I suppose, gave me a way out of this confusion. I was
now able to state that none of these theories or calls for action was the true or right one but all
were acceptable ways of understanding domestic violence. What we need to do is not weigh a
theory up according to its truth-value but according to its usefulness and the underlying
assumptions that it takes for granted. There is no reality 'out there' waiting to be discovered, but
rather we construct our reality through language. This critical, reflexive approach allowed me to
see some light through the clouds of competing ideas. But once again, darkness soon fell on this
bright day.
As I returned to the continual flow of women entering the support groups I was once again struck
by the way in which the theory seemed to have been developed in a world apart from theirs. The
reflexivity of poststructuralism left me at a loss as to what to do. I was crippled by it. Everything
was good enough, there was no right way to do things, but at the same time, nothing was good
enough and I could not decide what theory should guide my practise. How could I choose
between a mass of theories if all were acceptable? Back once more to the separate development
of my academic life and my sense of responsibili1y to the women with whom I worked.
At this point, I remain struck by the theoretical merit of the social constructionist movement in
psychology. But I long for the passion and vigour that accompanied my encounter with feminism.
It was a time of action and unity in spite of the conflicts. What I am left with is a desire to find an
understanding of domestic violence that allows the theoretical merits of poststructuralism to
emerge without losing the feminist focus on practise and the lived experiences of women. A
theory that allows us to critique and expose the artificiality of the assumptions, categories and
notions that we take for granted and that allows patriarchy to escape the clutches of feminism, in
spite of the drastic changes in power that are supposed to have occurred between the sexes. I aim
in this thesis to show that a poststructuralist analysis of domestic violence needn't disappear into
the mists of the ivory tower and can still be infonned by a feminist ethos. In addition it is both
possible and essential that our critique of the categories and assumptions accepted by both
mainstream theory and feminism do not neglect the very real ways in which these categories
reinforce the oppression experienced by those who are supposed to belong to them. More
importantly, I aim to show that this approach can lead to a more cr~tical and reflexive practise
that allows for an account of the power relations in psychological theory in spite of its claims to
be apolitical.
Most books written on domestic violence begin ~rith a debate around the definition of the subject
matter. I have purposefully avoided entering into such a debate. The definition that one uses will
clearly be influenced by the theoretical approach' aken. For example in proposing a
communication approach to domestic violence, Cahn (1996) define domestic violence as "the
ability to impose ones will (i.e., wants, needs, or desires) on another person through the use of
verbal or nonverbal acts, or both, done in a way that violates socially acceptable standards and
carried out with the intention or the perceived intention of inflicting physical or psychological
pain, injury, or suffering or both....the description of a communication perspective on domestic
violence includes the goals and effects of message behaviours that are intended or perceived as
intended" (p. 6). This can be contrasted to the fenlinist approach that defines domestic violence,
according to Adams (1988), as a "controlling behavior that serves to create and maintain an
imbalance of power between the battering man and the battered woman" (p. 191). The definition
of domestic violence in this study came from the women in the group. They were self identified
abused women and what they recognised as abuse and their given reasons for it were not
challenged. The range of experiences that they mentioned were wide and at times unexpected. In
addition, the women were all married and living in heterosexual relationships. For this reason, no
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attempt has been made to distinguish between dOInestic violence and \vife battering, or to
account for abuse within homosexual relationships.
The first chapter outlines the mainstream theory on domestic violence. This is kept purposely
brief as my concern is not for the details of the theories but for the ways in which domestic
violence is constructed as a problem of self and the assumptions underlying this self. I have
classified the theories somewhat simplistically according to their theoretical orientation in an
attempt to highlight where differences and similarities exist between them. I end the chapter with
a discussion of how feminism has contributed to our understanding of domestic violence in what
I consider to be profound ways as well as the ways in which it has not differed from mainstream
theory. The second chapter aims to show how a feminist understanding can be enhanced by the
concepts of poststructuralism. What I argue is that rather than being accurate and scientific
accounts of domestic violence, it is useful to con~,ider the theories identified in chapter two as
productive discourses. This viewpoint allows us to consider how domestic violence has been
constructed through psychological discourse, at the expense of competing accounts, as a problem
of self. From this approach, we can see psychological accounts of domestic violence as well as
the therapeutic encounter as being saturated with power relations and requiring critical reflection.
In order to achieve this theoretical position, I shall look critically at the notion of self and the
psychologisation of the problem of domestic violence.
The notion of a feminist poststructuralism leads to a novel methodology. Here the task is simpler
as a discursive analysis of the experiences ofwonlen can be done under the direction of a
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feminist ethos and the two methods are largely complimentary. Discourse analysis has long been
used for the exposing of political concerns and has, therefore, been a useful tool for feminism
(Burman, 1991).
Having outlined the methodology, I shall provide an analysis of the material in an attempt to
show how the merging of feminism and poststructuralism allows for a new understanding of the
power relations inherent to domestic violence. The starting point of this thesis is that much of
the mainstream literature on domestic violence has presented itself as both apolitical and
ahistorical. The feminist objection to such an approach to domestic violence has been extremely
useful in exposing the power relations that are central to domestic violence and transforming our
understanding of domestic violence from a therapeutic to a political opportunity. However, the
feminist understanding has offered a useful but Lmited understanding of power. It has viewed
power as something that one group has and another lacks. This fails to take account of the ways
in which psychological and feminist theory is itsdf imbued with power relations. Through a
discussion of the psy-complex (Rose, 1985) and the nature if the subjectivity that is assumed by
psychological discourse, another, more productive and less repressive understanding of power is
made possible which the feminist understanding of power is unable, in its present form, to take
account of. This is a view of power well docume:nted in the work of Foucault and Rose. I argue,
however, that the Rosean understanding of power fails to account for the ways in which this new,
productive power is gendered. That is, in his exposure of how the psy-sciences make possible a
new form of power he does not consider how this may have different implications for men and
women or reinforce a gendered subjectivity. Thus the feminist approach to power remains a
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useful one in an analysis of domestic violence but it can be complemented by an analysis of
power as conceptualised by Foucault.
CHAPTER TWO
SUBJECTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In 1988, Bograd stated that until 15 years ago, hardly any information on wife abuse existed.
Initially, it was feminist activists who began working on the issue by setting up shelters for
battered women and forming networks to aid wornen abused by their partners. The terms
battering and marital rape were coined soon afterwards (Bograd, 1988). Since then, it seems that
there has been a explosion of literature on the topic. This literature has largely been an extension
of mainstream psychological theory into this newly identified domain.
The interest that psychology has shown this topic allows for a specific conceptualisation of the
problem which differs from the conceptualisation offered by other disciplines. Domestic violence
is not seen as an illness (as, for example, it may have been if a medical explanation was given for
it) and it is, therefore, not curable through drugs or surgery. Rather, domestic violence, from a
psychological perspective, is constructed as a problem of self. This analysis of the
psychologisation of domestic violence is adapted from Rose's (1985,1988,1990,1993) work.
This chapter aims to show that despite the diversity of therapeutic approaches from which a
'consumer' can choose, they are all concerned wi.th the clients sense of self; their identity. It is
assumed that there is a discrepancy between their present self and their desired self. This self is
changeable and fluid and the aim of therapy is thus to guide the person towards their desired self.
This is done initially through the self-scrutiny of the individual who evaluates himself/herself
according to a norm and, as a result, perceives himself/herself as lacl<ing in some way.
Psychological theory then provides people with a 'manual' for changing themselves into the ideal
or desired self. Therapy is 'sold' through a promise of happiness and satisfaction if this desired
self is achieved. The happiness for which one strives is thus synonymous with the success of the
therapy (Rose 1990).
This chapter has two aims. Firstly, I aim to overview, very briefly, the kinds of approaches that
have typically been taken by psychologists in dealing with domestic violence. In doing so, I aim
also to suggest that despite their diversity, they share certain fundamental assumptions, that is,
they take the basis of therapy to be the self which is transformed into its full potential through
self-scrutiny and self-management.
The Psychological Approaches
Perhaps the branch of theory that has received the most interest and debate are the psychoanalytic
and other intrapsychic theories of domestic violence. Okun (1986) states that for psychoanalysts,
masochism is an innately feminine trait. The victim has a central role in provoking the abuse as
she is in fact demanding a dominant response from her partner. The masochism of women is,
from this perspective, a psychological trait that exhibits itself in self-sacrifice, self-degradation,
self-punishment and suicidal behaviour to mention a few such 'feminine' traits (Okun, 1986).
Aside from such controversial ideas, psychoanalysis has paid little attention to domestic
violence. In a similar vein, however, there are still many theories that explain domestic violence
in terms of intrapsychic factors residing in one or both of the parties. For example, Rothschild,
Dimson, Storaasli and Clapp (1997) aimed to uncover the personality characteristics of veterans
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who had been perpetrators of domestic violence. They state that the MCMI-II scores showed this
sample to have subclinical narcissism, narcissistic personality disorder and high general
psychopathology. Similarly, men who abuse their wives have, in other studies, been described as
having deficits in social competence and neurotic symptoms (Spaccarelli, Bowden, Coatsworth
and Kim, 1997) as well as being poor empathisers (Forte, Franks, Forte and Rigsby, 1996).
Ammerman and Herson (1990) suggest that batterers have more poorly defined sexual identities,
lower self-esteem and are attention seekers. They are more likely to interpret their spouse's
behaviour as damaging to their self-esteem. Bersa.ni, Chen and Pendleton (1992) summarise
some of their findings thus: " ...compared to the general population they are more nervous,
indifferent, and impulsive. They also have a slight tendency to be more depressive, subjective,
dominant and hostile" (p. 128).
These descriptions can be seen as descriptions of the selves of batlerers. Battering is described as
being manifested in the internal characteristics of the man who is abusive and/or the woman who
is abused. It is assumed that a score on a psychometric test is a representation of the man's
potential to batter, that is, it measures that part of him responsible for the battering. Given this
understanding of the man who batters, specific techniques for self-scrutiny are developed which
lead, if successful, to self-management of the problem.
Adams (1988) describes these techniques stating that through educating the man into methods of
self-inspection, the man is encouraged to focus on his past traumas, through such techniques as
introspection, in an attempt to reduce his need to abuse others. The aims of such therapy would
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be to boost the man's feelings of efficacy in various areas, such as sexuality or parenting, and to
redefine masculinity in such a way as to reduce the violence that is seen to be an
overcompensating behaviour stemming from a fear of his feminine side (Adams, 1988). Self-
inspection thus occurs during introspection under the supervision of the therapist. The therapist
then teaches the man what changes are needed to his existing self in order to cope and respond
more appropriately and less violently. In other words, he learns what needs to be done in order to
reach his ideal self as defined in therapy.
More recently, domestic violence has begun to be defined as an interpersonal or communication
deficit between couples. Battering is thus identified as just one aspect of a dysfunctional
interaction pattern between the couple. Cahn (1996) provides a detailed account of this
perspective on domestic violence. He states that there is more evidence to suggest that the
communication between a couple is the best indicator of violence than any other possible
predictor. In a similar way to the intrapsychic or learning theories, the author suggests that a
communication perspective would accept that battering may be a result of a loss of control due to
increased emotional arousal or sympathetic nervous system arousal, a decrease in one's cognitive
control and a reliance on learned behaviours. In other words we learn bad communication
patterns and when these are combined with the above mentioned biological responses violence
could result. Domestic violence is, therefore, defined as a poor and socially unacceptable
communication pattern (Cahn, 1996).
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Frieze and McHugh (1992) follow a similar line of reasoning and suggest that the decision
making style of the couple should be considered as a predictor of violence in a marriage. They
identify six possible decision making styles. The first is Positive-direct which describes the
couple that 'talk things over'. Other-direct strategies include identifying oneself as the expert on
the topic being discussed or referring to what others do in a similar situation. Coercive-direct
approaches to problem resolution can include either physical coercion, such as violence, or
verbal coercion, such as swearing or shouting., Positive~ire.st strategies include being
affectionate or nice to one's spouse in order to affect the outcome of the communication. Ignore-
indirect strategies would include pretending there was no problem or showing no emotion and
Withdraw-indirect strategies include emotional withdrawal or threatening to leave the
relationship (pp. 455-456). They summarise their findings by stating that, "overall the most
commonly used strategies for all the women were indirect positive strategies...and the direct
strategies....withdrawal was also relatively highly rated" (p. 456). In addition, they state that
"husbands who were violent were reported to use most of the influencing strategies more
frequently than were the nonviolent husbands, exeept for the positive strategies. More attention
should be given to the ways in which violence relates to decision making within marriage" (p.
460).
These findings are reinforced in the work of Cahn (1996) who states that an interaction between
spouses that is violent is characterised by negativt~ and emotional problem-solving discussions
and a depressed atmosphere. In addition, the abuser slowly develops antisocial patterns of
. behaviour, rigid and predictable behaviour, and progressively fewer positive communications or
negotiations. Similarly, Berman, John and Margolin (1992) studied couples engaged in conflict
discussions and found that physically aggressive couples had discussions that increased the
chance of verbal aggression. Couples that were not maritally distressed showed fewer such
negative cycles of interaction. The communication perspective is, therefore, concerned with the
goals and effects of abuse as a message behaviour or as a dimension of communication (Cahn,
1996).
Here the focus of the problem has been shifted av/ay from characteristics within the individual. It
is still defined, however, in terms of the kind of person that is abused or abusive. That is, abusive
couples are ones in which one or both partners communicate in an ineffective and destructive
manner. Here the problem is identified by looking at one aspect of the individual's self, namely,
their communication.
Adams (1988) suggests that therapy from this perspective would view violence as just one
expression of a dysfunctional interaction pattern. Communication is considered to be a joint
venture and as such is given joint meaning by the two parties (Cahn, 1996). For this reason,
therapy focuses on both parties and each would be expected to examine the ways in which they
contribute to the violence (Adams, 1988). The therapy would focus on teaching the couple more
effective and socially acceptable patterns of comnlunication. The self is once again the focus of
the intervention. Each party 'looks' at the kind of self that they are and identifies through therapy
their ideal self. The ideal self is defined according to the kinds of relationships that one would
like to have and the kind of communication skills that one needs to have in order to acquire such
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relationships. One thus attempts through therapy to acquire and maintain an identity that is
different from one's existing identity. This is achieved through examining one's relationships and
the ways in which our' self impacts on these relationships. The in~entive that encourages this
process is the promise of happier relationships if one is successful. The steps to return to our
normal, happy selves are, therefore, identified and followed.
Cognitive behavioural models of domestic violence are also widely used. This perspective
assumes that battering is a behaviour that is acquired because it has the desired effect and is thus
reinforced. In addition, it can be learned through modeling. Hamberger and Lohr (1989) state that
through learning, verbal attacks may gradually come to have the same significance as physical
ones as they are usually associated or paired with physical attacks. The physical attack will thus
be an unconditioned stimulus and the symbolic behaviours such as verbal attacks will become a
conditioned stimulus. The approach is considered cognitive-behavioural because it is concerned
with verbal mediators of violence as well as the fUnctional aspects of behaviour (Hamberger and
Lohr, 1989).
Learning theories have led to an interest in whether violent behaviours are transmitted across
generations. Truscott (1992) looked at the impact of domestic violence on the violent behaviour
of adolescent males and found support for the hypothesis that violence is transmitted from
generation to generation. Violent behaviour was related to having experienced physical or verbal
paternal violence but not the witnessing of violence or having experienced maternal violence.
Hamberger and Lohr (1989) suggest that language is an element of cognition that allows us to
respond to events that are not physically present as if they were. Through a process of
conditioning, our words take on an emotional meaning. For example calling your wife a 'slut'
conjures up a particular image associated with the words. This label (slut) is generalised and
other associated words are conjured up (lazy, bitchy etc.). The man tells himself that his wife is
like that label and the choice of label will mediate his actions. The batterer then acts to decrease
the negative emotions associated with this labelling process through violence. The labelling
process has, in this way, led to negative emotions about his wife who need not even be present.
The label may well be inaccurate and this would lead to an inaccurate reasoning sequence (for
example, 'if she's late she must be having an affair'). The verbal cognitive instructions that the
batterer gives himself help to explain battering. 'Thought Stopping' could be used in an example
like this to help interrupt such thoughts and replace them with constructive ones (Webb, 1992).
Cognitive behavioural models thus suggest that the lack of satisfaction the person feels with their
present sense of self stems from having learned inappropriate or poor behaviours. Similarly, our
thought processes influence the way in which we understand a problem or event in our lives.
More important are the assumptions underlying t:le techniques of behaviour change. The notion
that one can engage in 'Thought Stopping' implies a particular notion of subjectivity; that is, the
individual is an autonomous agent capable of self-scrutiny and self-control. He/she is both
independent and self-reliant. As the self is under the control 'fthe individual, it becomes a site of
work for them.
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Changes to our selves, from this perspective, are to be made at the level of our behaviour and
thinking patterns. Treatment from this perspective would, therefore, include techniques such as
contingency management or the use of operant principles such as punishment, positive
reinforcement, extinction and negative reinforcenlent to try to highlight the negative
consequences of the battering (Adams 1988). Sinlilarly, techniques such as relaxation training
would allow for arousal reduction. Desensitisation, modeling and rehearsal, including
assertiveness training and other techniques, would be used to teach the man to be more
empathetic. Because anger leading to violence is thought to be a result of self-doubt or a feeling
of threat, the batterer could also be taught to analyse his self-talk to help him to keep the situation
in perspective and to congratulate himself when he is successful. An attempt is therefore made to
get abusive men to question and understand the ideas that lead them to become angry
(Hamberger and Lohr, 1989).
Following a similar framework, Webb (1992) ou:1ines a four step cognitive-behavioural
programme for women who are victims of domestic violence. The first step is to provide the
women with an explanation of the intervention so that she becomes aware of how it relates to the
violence. Secondly, role-plays and modeling are used to show her what the desired behaviour is
for her. This is based on the assumption that when growing up, women often learn inappropriate
responses to violence such as focusing on making'!' statements, like, "when you clench your
teeth, I feel anxious because I think you are angry with me" (Webb, 1992, p. 213). The woman
then practices and rehearses these new behaviours and she is taught to execute her new learned
behaviours successfully. In addition, women leanl to make more accurate evaluations of
17
themselves and their abilities and to view the situation from a number of different perspectives.
Here, most clearly, we are able to see the ways in which psychology provides a manual or a set of
instructions for the achievement of the desired self. The desired self as defined through therapy,
will allow for happier, more successful relationships if reached.
Geffner, Mantooth, Franks and Rao (1989) outline the family systems approach to battering. For
family systems theorists, the term family violence is more appropriate as the abusive family is
seen to be a closed information system in which violent behaviour serves to maintain equilibrium
in the family (Geffner, Mantooth, Franks and Rao, 1989). The behaviour of each person affects
that of the other. Neither party is blamed for the violence because they are thought to know no
better behaviour (Adams, 1989). In an abusive relationship, there is thought to be unilateral
control in the system and there is little room for negotiation (Geffner, Mantooth, Franks and Rao,
1989). Bott (1994) states that " ... family systems thinking is primarily concerned with current
relationships in the clients' life and symptomatic behaviour is understood as performing a
function in relation to an unresolved family dilen1llla" (p. 107).
From the perspective of Geffner, Mantooth, Franks and Rao (1989) two kinds of change are
possible for such a system. First order change occurs when there is a decrease in the violence but
the values, assumptions and roles in the family remain the same. Second order change occurs
when the ideas of the family members regarding the family have changed. The aim of family
systems interventions is to maintain the functional family. To this end both parties to the
marriage are included in treatment and are taught techniques for the reduction of violence. The
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assumption of this approach is that one cannot separate the abuser from the abused, submission
from domination, aggressiveness from passivity and so on. The family is informed that their
problem is context bound and that contexts are both changeable and relative. The focus here
remains on the' symptomatic behaviour' of the client (Bott, 1994). This approach stands apart
from others, however in that the behaviour of the individual is seen to be influenced by his/her
social environment. In understanding how a person becomes the self that he/she is, one must
consider that changes in one part of the system influence other parts of the system.
Geffner, Mantooth, Franks and Rao (1989) continue by stating that the treatment takes a 'no
blame approach' in an attempt to avoid the endless cycles of blaming that families typically get
into. A further advantage to this approach is that it increases the families trust in and bonding
with the therapist. Responsibility for one's behaviour is, however, encouraged. The techniques
used would include role-playing to re-enact a misunderstanding and homework to reinforce the
techniques that have been learned. In addition people are taught to be attentive to their body cues
and feelings, for example, how they feel when they begin to get angry. Fair fighting is
encouraged through teaching family members how to express themselves effectively and how to
get their needs met. Rational Emotive Techniques are also used to help the family take
responsibility for their role in the abuse. Adams (1988) adds to this by suggesting that family
systems theory sees battering as being caused by the man and the woman who have difficulty
separating from their original family and use violence to achieve homeostasis in the
distance/closeness theme. Yegidis, (1992) sugges.ts that "the therapist will need to address issues
related to parental boundaries, role, and enmeshnlent. ... the clinical work with the mother is often
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especially key.... she must be helped to address her disbelief and to develop her ability to protect
her children" (p. 527).
Here, once more, the focus of the therapy is, not surprisingly, on decreasing violence. This is
achieved through the individuals in the family monitoring themselves (their body cues,
boundaries, parenting etc.) in terms of a norm. For example, Bott (1994) states that Minuchin
provides a model of a normal family. He suggests that "The family system and sub-systems
within it are surrounded by clearly marked but permeable boundaries. The marital or partner sub-
system is particularly well defined, in order to protect the privacy of partners, while the boundary
around the parental sub-system will be more open to allow effective parenting... .individuation is
supported by respect for the boundaries around individuals and family members are able to think
and speak for themselves" (Bott, 1994, p. 109). The techniques for changing oneself in relation to
this norm are provided through therapy.
Feminist Responses To The Psychological Approaches
From a feminist perspective, a number of criticisms of the above theories can be put forward. All
to a greater or lesser degree are psychological th~~ories of domestic violence. The processes in our
broader society and the ways in which these influence domestic violence are largely ignored.
Even those theorists who criticise intrapsychic approaches (such as Cahn, 1996) do not consider
factors existing outside of the immediate family. As a result of this, issues of power are seldom
addressed. Also, the assumption that the violence is merely a symptom of a deeper underlying
problem is questioned by feminists as is displaces the focus of therapy and misnames the
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problem (Adams, 1989). Finally the descriptions of the processes of violence are couched in
terms removed from the everyday language and terms of women (Ran1azanoglu, 1993). In this
way these theories serve to silence the experiences of women and their ways of understanding
them. Feminism has made a number of contributions to the study of domestic violence by
addressing these issues.
Feminist theorists believe that battering is a result of a male desire to dominate women. Violence
is used to reinforce a man's authority, especially if the sex roles are unclear in the relationship
(Harway & Hansen, 1993). Men are believed to learn violent behaviour and make a choice when
to use it. For example, a man who is abusive towards his wife is unlikely to be as aggressive
towards his employer. Responsibility must therefore be taken for his actions (Adams, 1988).
Women are in turn socialised into taking a submissive role in the family, as well as taking a
primary role in the private sphere whilst the same time being excluded from the public sphere.
This is thought to result from our gender role development. In schools, especially, boys and girls
are treated differently and expected to behave accordingly. Girls tend to have a more
communicative and agreeable relationship with their peers whereas boys tend to have
hierarchical relationships with their peers (Hansen, 1993). Power and control, be it political,
economic, social or physical are, therefore, the rnain aims of battering. Frieze and McHugh
(1992) take a feminist view of violence when they state that "the research reported here confirms
the observation that violence is indeed used as a power strategy within marriage" (p. 460). Pence
(1989) provides an overview of a progranlme informed by this perspective. She notes that the
acts that men perform are intentional and aimed at achieving a particular end. The acts that they
use are similar to those used by any group with power aiming to maintain the subordination of
others. These tactics rest on the belief that those in oppressed positions are there as a result of a
deficiency or weakness within themselves.
Adams (1989) suggests that wife abuse has political meaning because it affects the balance of
power between individuals. Men are thought to resort to violence to gain compliance and signal
their power. To this end physical abuse is likely to be accompanied by other strategies, such as,
psychological abuse in an attempt to decrease the self-esteem of their partner and increase her
dependence on him. Economic abuse is also used to increase the man's power by controlling all
the material resources in the family such as money, cars, bank accounts, or through not paying
maintenance. Finally, the wife is given primary responsibility for the domestic work in the family
and is not free to refuse childcare, housekeeping or the sexual or emotional demands of her
husband. The woman is socially isolated due, either, to the man physically restricting her social
activities, or through shame of the abuse and fear that socialising may trigger abuse. These
findings show that men benefit from abusing their wives in that they are allowed to uphold
unequal power relations, double standards and unequal privileges. The feminist focus is thus on
the utility of domestic violence rather than its psychological aetiology (Adams, 1989).
In addition, (Adams, 1988) suggests that domestic violence is considered to be a practice that is
rooted in patriarchy. Violence is thus addressed as a form of sexism rather than a deficit in a
particular skill such as communication or proble:m management. Similarly, feminists point out
that abusive men often display adequate social skills in public and only seem to lack them in
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private where there is no motivation for them to use them (Adams, 1989). According to a
feminist perspective, previous approaches misname the problem because they minimise or ignore
issues of power. As a result, Meth (1992) states that "many of our current models for working
with violent men minimise the impact and consequences of violent behaviour" (p. 259).
Bograd (1988) notes that a further problenl with rrlainstream theories of domestic violence are
that they focus on domestic violence as an abnorrr ality or a pathology. She suggests that the
prevalence of domestic violence in our societies suggests that it is instead the norm. She feels
that the theories of domestic violence are differentially applied to men and women in an attempt
to excuse men's violence and shift some of the blame on to women. In addition, comparisons of
the psychological differences between abused WOlnen and women not abused should be seen as
studies of the effects of violence, rather than the causes thereof. As with other feminist theorists,
she is critical of the theories that do not consider questions of power. She does not recommend
the rejection of existing psychological theories but rather suggests that we begin to link them
within the social context of patriarchy and the patterns of gender relations. This could result in
some normalisation and de-pathologising of the issue. She suggests that domestic violence, rather
than being an oddity, is central to the way in which the contemporary family is organised and
structured. She also cautions against the labelling of women through therapy, which could
perpetuate stereotypes about battered women and affect our responses to them.
Feminist theorists, therefore, tend to see domestic violence as a socialised pattern of behaviour
that develops within our patriarchal society. Although it is considered by some feminists to be a
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normal and predictable behaviour pattern given the way in which our society is structured it is
nevertheless an undesirable phenomenon. Feminist approaches have been extremely useful in
ensuring that the blame for the violence is not placed on the woman and that men take
responsibility for their violent behaviour.
Although feminists strive for the ideal of gender and political equality, they recognise that this is
indeed an ideal and no therapy will ever be non-political or egalitarian. Similarly a gender free
language is an unattainable ideal towards which therapists should strive. (Hansen, 1993).For this
reason, the cultural and political beliefs of the therapist and the client should be made explicit
before beginning therapy rather than either party claiming to be value-free. The main goal of
therapy would be to challenge the man's attempts to control his wife. The aim is to eliminate all
behaviour that undermines women's rights, not just physical violence. Adams (1989) states that
feminist approaches have used some of the techniques from Social Leaming Theory as well as
communication theories in attempting to teach men to examine their attitudes and sex role
stereotypes. Men are educated as to the effects of abuse and expected to take responsibility for
their actions often through identifying their excuses for battering and being challenged on thenl.
Men are expected to keep logs of their abusive and controlling behaviour. 'Male bonding' is said
to occur when men in group therapy reinforce one another's negative stereotypes about women. It
is considered the therapist's role to interrupt this process. This directly contradicts the ways in'
which men are socialised. Thus, "the profeminist educational curriculum helps men to recognise
that their attitudes, expectations and behaviours toward women are not unique. They exist in a
social context that restricts the freedom of women, gives unfair advantages to men, and promotes
misogynistic attitudes" (Adams, 1989, p. 14). As Erickson (1992) suggests, "it is our job as
therapists, both female and male, to midwife the rebirth of (this) Man. That takes finn limits on
his abuses of power while we work to get up underneath his defenGes to find the more gentle,
tender, mature human emotions that likely are there but were cauterized long ago by his
socialisation and by his early life experiences" (p. 266). For this reason, a central goal of therapy
is encouraging the abuser to advocate for social change in his community and to raise awareness
of sexism. An evaluation of a feminist therapeutic intervention would consider not only personal
changes within the man but also changes that he has been active in at a community level.
(Adams, 1989).
Feminist theory has, therefore, contributed to the psychological literature in several profound
ways. Firstly it has questioned the assumptions about gender differences which are implicit in
mainstream theory. For example it criticises mainstream theories for seeing violence as
secondary to other problems and thus allowing rnen to displace responsibility for the violence. It
also questions the assumption that certain roles, behaviours and attitudes, such as motherhood,
caregiving and sensitivity, are taken as natural for women and the way that these are
unquestioningly accepted by mainstream psychol.ogists. In addition, it points to the fact that many
theories are inconsistent with the reports of women and as such their accuracy is questioned.
Secondly feminism considers the power relations between men and women and how these
pervade not only abusive relationships but every aspect of our daily lives. Changes are expected
at the societallevel as opposed to just the individual level. The second main point of departure
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for feminist approaches is, therefore, that they expect the new values of the batterer to be
extended into his community. The batterer is, therefore, not only expected to work on his own
self but on the selves of other men that he comes into contact with. The ideal self that this man
has achieved can, in this way, be transmitted to many men thereby increasing the efficacy of the
goals of therapy. Feminism looks at the ways in which the subordination of women is beneficial
to men. Violence is the most overt way in which nlen can control women and even men that are
not violent benefit from the ways in which women's lives are limited because they live with the
constant threat of violence. This makes women dependent on men and in so doing reinforces
men's domination and control. Other social divisions are seen to be secondary to gender divisions
(Bograd, 1988). Finally, feminist approaches focus on the experiences of women and analyse
existing theory for bias. The bias inherent in traditional theories of domestic violence are
considered to be a reflection of male constructed understandings of women (Bograd 1988).
There are, however, areas in which feminism has not differed significantly from the traditional
literature on domestic violence. Therapy has still been seen as the primary solution to eradicating
domestic violence although community, social and legal changes are also thought to be
necessary. The therapy that has been offered has still focused on issues of the self. Although the
cause of battering is cited as our patriarchal society, the 'cure' is focused on the man's
subjectivity. He is expected to challenge the assUlnptions and values that underlie his identity as
a man and these new found attitudes are expected to be carried into the broader society.
Feminism in its understanding of domestic violence has made use of the psychological terms and
techniques that have been developed. This approach has critiqued the kinds of selves that are
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constructed in therapy, for example, Emerson Dobash and Dobash (1992), in their chapter
entitled The therapeutic community constructs battered women and violent men, suggest that
" ... therapeutic accounts usually emphasise the unique backgrounds and permanent personality
traits that make women vulnerable to violent relationships and unable to leave them" (p. 224).
Rather than seeing abused women as women with particular personality characteristics, feminism
has offered a new understanding of the self. Battered women are women who are made
vulnerable to abuse through their socialisation. Feminism challenges traditional understandings
of domestic violence but it still locates the problem at the level of the self. These feminist
understandings of abuse draw from the experiences of those working as shelter advocates and
from the battered women themselves. The credibility of the feminist description of self comes
from the fact that it has not been 'discovered' by the experts, but described by those with 'hands
on' experience of the issue (Emerson Dobash and Dobash, 1992). Similarly, as with other
approaches, techniques are then offered which are aimed at changing the man's sense of self
(helping him to become less violent and developing more appropriate cognitive schema about
women) as well as that of the woman (becoming less dependent on the man and more assertive).
The explanation for domestic violence focuses on the selves of those in a marriage and sees the
self as the raw material on which to work toward.s overcoming domestic violence.
It is perhaps necessary to point out at this stage that it is not my intention to suggest that there is
anything wrong with therapy focusing its attempts at change on notions of the self. What I am
suggesting in the chapters that follow is that we need an ongoing awareness of what kind of a
subject we are assuming when we attempt change, how we aim to make the change and how it is
that people come to desire a different self identity. Clearly, the goal of decreasing domestic
violence is a common one. The ways in which this. is to be achieved is not, however, common.
We need a new understanding of power in order to see the ways in which psychology is powerful
and what the effects of this power, both positive and negative, could be.
To elaborate on this, Rose (1990) suggests that the regulation of subjectivity has become central
to modem government. This regulation is not achieved via a centralised state but through a
"complex and heterogeneous assemblage of technologies" (p. 213) of which psychological
expertise is one. The language of psychology has been seen increasingly frequently in many
diverse forms from self-help books to radio phone-in. 'so The message from these technologies is
that happiness is to be reached through working on our selves. The effects of these technologies
of the self is that we have become increasingly self-monitoring and self-regulating. The self can
be seen to shift according to the norms and expectations that are placed upon it. This notion of
the self-monitoring and self-governing individual requires an understanding of power that is not
provided by the feminist writers in the field. We need to be able to ask what kind of self is
constructed through psychological theory, what power psychology has to construct the self in this
way, and what the nature of the power is that psychology, as a technology of the self, has for
constructing the self. It is at answering these questions that this thesis is aimed.
Some Conclusions
This overview of the literature on domestic violence reveals certain common themes. The central
assumption evident in these theories is that domestic violence is a problem of subjectivity. In
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proposing a theory, a particular understanding of the self is implied. The theories can, therefore,
be said to describe a particular kind of subject. The subject described is one that is capable of
being self-monitoring. They are able, in cognitive··behavioural terms, to monitor their own
thought processes and 'stop' these thoughts when they become irrational. The self is, therefore,
self-governing in the sense that we identify our ovvn flaws and problems through a process of
self-surveillance. The self is also autonomous. The literature on domestic violence suggests that
people are independent and responsible for changing themselves and their behaviour. They take
responsibility for their behaviour and monitor it so as to reduce the unwanted behaviours. The
self can be described as the raw material on which we work or the site on which we act when we
perceive ourselves to be lacking in some way. This change should not, therefore, be seen as one
that is forced upon us or even expected. Rather wle seek out this change gladly and in the name of
freedom and happiness. This understanding of subjectivity is to be taken further in the following
chapters. I will argue that this understanding of subjectivity is a result of the permeation of what
Rose (1985) terms the psy-complex, that is, the increasing psychologisation of socially deviant
behaviour. The psy-complex is, however, a systern of governance that has failed to be adequately
analysed given the repressive and prohibitive understanding of power identified by feminism.
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CHAPTE~R THREE
THE PRODUCTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Chapter two identified the assumption of a self in psychological theories of domestic violence.
The aim of this chapter is to elaborate on this reading of the literature by arguing that domestic
violence is a discursive production. It is not only produced precisely through those discourses or
theories that claim to document it but it has also been produced in a very specific way, that is, as
a problem of self. Although different theories of domestic violence give different, and at times,
opposing accounts of its subjects, this chapter argues that these accounts share certain
fundamental assumptions. In addition, I will argue that theory on domestic violence has primarily
arisen to address a need (violence between married couples). In other words, the nature of the self
that psychology has assumed stems from the practices of psychology, in this case the techniques
of reducing violence, rather than from the documentation or theorisation of domestic violence.
The construction of domestic violence in terms of the self can, therefore, be seen to accomplish
certain ends which, I will argue are, social regulation and administration. More specifically, by
constructing the self as autonomous and self-mon.'toring, our present self can be seen as a result
of our past choices. In this way, the self becomes a site upon which we can work (Barry, Osbome
and Rose, 1996). In other words, we become able to shape and responsible for shaping the kinds
of selves that we are. I will further suggest that as psychology plays a role in constructing the self
as a site of work and social regulation, it can be seen as a form of power. Furthermore it is a form
of power that has escaped the scrutiny of feminisnl through its claims to document reality and its
assumptions that power relations exist outside the realm of psychology.
30
The Historical Construction Of Domestic Violf:nce Through Discourse
In this chapter I follow the argument made by Faucault (1980) that knowledge is productive and
as such affects the objects to which it refers. In other words, in developing a theory of domestic
violence, we are at the same time re-constructing and changing both the conceptualisation of
domestic violence and the subjects to which the theory refers. A similar point is made by Rose
(1988) when he states that "such authoritative texts of scientific history play a key role in
constructing the image of the present reality of the: discipline in question" (p. 180). My aim is not
to suggest that mainstream theory conspires with abusive men to ensure the oppression of
women, but rather to suggest that it is necessary to consider how our understandings of domestic
violence have come about, that is, their history. In other words, if our modem view of domestic
violence is historically constructed through discot:rse, what conditions made this view of
domestic violence possible? This question cannot be answered if we accept that psychology has
simply mapped the characteristics of domestic violence as it exists in external reality. Rose
(1985) states that this notion of psychology merely reflecting that that exists in reality was
necessary for the development of psychology and its establishment as an effective field of
knoW-edge. As a discipline, psychology had to be able to make claims to accuracy if it was to
present itself as useful. Psychology has, in this way, come to rest on the assumption that there are
psychological facts (such as domestic violence being a problem of self). Rose (1988) identifies
the importance of considering the history of psychological discourse. He states that "rather than
marginalize these texts of the past from the point of view of the present, we might do better to
question the certainties of the present by attention to such margins and to the process of their
marginalization" (p. 180-181). In other words, we must consider what history of domestic
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violence has been presented and what has been ITlarginalised or ignored and how this has resulted
in our present conceptualisation of the object (domestic violence). In this way, we can begin to
unravel some of the assumptions and taken for granted concepts that have been produced through
their development. It is this unravelling that this project is concerned with.
To elaborate on this claim, consider the coining of terms such as 'wife battering', 'domestic
violence', 'marital rape' and related concepts. Through the development of such concepts,
abused women can begin to be identified. They are women who fit the definition of such terms.
In addition, the boundaries of the subject matter are identified and forged and the roles of various
individuals in the violence and the causes thereof may also be identified. Take, as a further
illustration, the definition offered by Geffner and Pagelow (1990). They define spouse abuse as
" ...a pattern of behaviour in a relationship by which one person victimizes the other. Abuse can
take many forms: physical, sexual, verbal, and/or psychological." (p. 113). Those who are abused
then, are those who are victimised in one of the vv'ays listed. This process of construction through
definition serves to exclude those not fitting the description (such as women who are emotionally
abused) as well as include some who, under a different definition, would not have been abused
spouses (such as those psychologically abused women who would not be victims of spouse abuse
if the definition referred only to physical violenct} The definition clearly suggests two role
players, namely, a victim and a perpetrator both of whom have particular actions and roles in this
relationship. The psychological focus of the problem and of its causes ensures that psychological
solutions are sought. Psychology, therefore, plays a role not only in the production of the object
(domestic violence) but also of the subject (those who are abusers and those who abuse) and
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through this process of production sets itself up as the solution. The object is a problem whose
solution rests on psychological understandings thereof. These psychological understandings take
as their starting point a very particular understanding of the self. What is required then is not a
history of psychology and how it has developed, but a history of the object. According to Rose
(1985) the development of the history of domestic violence through psychological discourse
would serve to designate it as a psychological problem, that is, one existing within the realm of
psychology. Through this "psychological historiography", domestic violence is not only viewed
as existing but it is also produced (Rose, 1985, p. 224).
This argument suggests that the discourse on donlestic violence plays a central role in the
construction of the object. More than this, however, this discourse has a history. The definition
given above draws on some aspects of past theory whilst rejecting others. The recollection of the
history of ideas on domestic violence by present day theorists functions to reject old or outdated
concepts whilst reinforcing new ones (Rose 1985). In the definition given by Geffner and
Pagelow (1990) above, the notions of women's tnasochistic tendencies are rejected in favour of
new terms (such as victimisation). In this way, history functions to organise the scientific truth of
domestic violence. The falsity of past theories is rejected to incorporate more accurate
understandings of domestic violence. The psychological theories outlined in chapter two also do
not recognise a politics. Given that they are put forward based on their accuracy, they can be seen
as apolitical. They do not serve political functions but document a real phenomenon in a
scientific manner.
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Henriques (1984) states that the birth of Humanism as well as the Women's Liberation
Movement led to a focus in psychology primarily on personal change and individual
consciousness. From a feminist orientation, therefore, women as individuals had to recognise the
oppressive ties that existed within their everyday interactions. The feminist slogan 'the personal
is political' takes its shape from these beliefs (Rose, 1996b). Personal change was seen to be the
key to political transformation. A useful contribution of feminism for the purposes of this
argument is, therefore, its focus on subjectivity and its assumption that subjectivity is produced
and dynamic rather than fixed and biologically determined (Weedon, 1987). For feminism,
gender roles are learned (Hansen 1993). One's individual subjectivity is thus fluid and dynamic
and it is at the level of the personal that social change becomes possible. A critique of
subjectivity requires that this point be extended to suggest not simply that the focus on the
individual be replaced with a focus on the social but rather that we consider how it is that the
social produces the individual, that is, how our social circumstances produce a particular
subjectivity. This stands in contrast to the debates highlighted in chapter two that centre around
whether domestic violence is a result of our social circumstances or innate traits. In other words,
I would extend the feminist understanding of subjectivity being produced to suggest that it is
produced through a specific set of discursive practices and as such is a historical construct. For
Parker (1989) the self is constructed through discourse and manifested in the texts of everyday
life. Similarly, Sampson (1989) states that "societies create both the types of character essential
to societal reproduction and the ideologies necessary so that those characters will function to
achieve this reproduction" (p. 5). Through discourse, particular kinds of people are constructed
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and this construction takes place in a manner that ensures that these constructions are continually
reproduced. The questions raised in this and later chapters ask what the utility of this
construction of subjectivity is as opposed to other possible constructions as well the effects of
this particular construction of subjectivity on both the object being constructed and the subjects
of that construction?
Homo Rationalis
If we accept then that psychological understandings of domestic violence have focused largely on
a conceptualisation of the self, what is the nature of the self that has been assumed? Rose (1990)
describes the citizens of the liberal democratic state as being self-regulating and taking an active
role in the management and direction of their own lives. Venn (1984) adds to this suggesting,
that the psychological subject is the unitary, rational and, by implication, male subject. Sampson
(1989) in tracing the history of the self over time notes how it has changed from people being
seen as inseparable from their family units to being conceptualised as private individuals, whom
he terms 'bourgeois individual(s)' (p. 3). This 'bourgeois individual' is integrated, non-
contradictory, unique, and - most importantly - fictitious (Sampson, 1989). Rose (1990) goes on
to suggest that rather than being motivated by a threat of punishment, these subjects are
motivated to think, want and feel in terms of a ps.ychological norm. If they are not motivated by
punishment, they cannot be motivated by force. They must instead be educated in such a manner
that they desire to shape their own lives through rnaking choices as autonomous individuals. This
desire should lead them to continually evaluate themselves in terms of certain values and adjust
themselves should they not meet this norm (Rose:, 1990). Consider as an illustration the cognitive
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behavioural technique of 'thought stopping'. This technique assumes the individual as an
autonomous agent with the power to monitor and regulate himself/herself. The individual is one
who recognises that his/her behaviour does not m.eet the norm and adjusts himself/herself
accordingly.
Clearly then, violence contravenes the psychological norm in terms of which we evaluate
ourselves. In the normal family, violence should not occur. If it does occur, the assumption is that
it should be recognised as contravening the psychological norm, that is, it should be recognised
as pathology. It should also be admitted to one qualified to hear and, based on this qualification,
to advise, reform and judge (Rose 1990). The explosion of publications on domestic violence in
the last 25 years can be viewed as a massive confessional as described by Foucault (1979). It is
this confessional that is so instrumental in governing our subjectivity. It is not only aimed at
restructuring the behaviour of pathological families, but through its publicisation, it also aims to
address those of us who are consensual members of normal families. As normal family members,
we are reassured by such discourses whilst they, at the same time, provide us with the language
and concepts with which to evaluate ourselves. Through psychological theory on domestic
violence, each family member is given their roles. and responsibilities. They are reassured of their
competency in carrying out these roles and persuaded that they require education by experts.
Thus the scandal surrounding domestic violence activates our normality in that we are reassured
of it . We thus become aware of the norms of falnily life and begin to monitor our degree of
adherence to them (Foucault, 1979).
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Here Foucault talks about the ways in which the confession has pervaded our everyday activities.
The confession has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in justice, medicine,
education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of
everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one's crimes, one's sins, one's
thoughts and desires, one's illnesses and troubles; one goes about telling with the greatest
precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. One confesses in public and in private, to
one's parents, one's educators, one's doctor, to those one loves; one admits to oneself, in
pleasure and in pain, things it would be irnpossible to tell anyone else, the things people
write books about. One confesses-or is forced to confess (Foucault, 1979, p. 59).
The subject matter of the confession does not rernain secret but is publicised by the experts. It is
through this publicisation that we are encouraged to monitor ourselves. The publicisation of
reports of domestic violence do not just address those families who experience violence. Rather
they address all of us as members of a normal fmnily as well. We identify with the confessions of
others and evaluate our own degree of deviation from the psychological norm. They do not,
therefore, only describe abnormality but in so doing construct normality. In this way, self control
is induced in individuals through encouraging them to monitor themselves. It also allows for the
encouragement of self-governance in such a way that we welcome and embrace it rather than
seeing it as restrictive and oppressive. Thus, the :modern democratic society rests on the
understanding of a particular kind of individual that does not require controlling. It is assumed
that he/she is able to govern himself/herself (Foucault, 1979). For example, women are
continually in contact with confession on domestic violence. These discourses reach us through
magazines, through self-help books, doctors waiting rooms and so on. We compare our own
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relationships to the relationships of those confessing. In this way a norm is presented according
to \vhich we can evaluate ourselves, our relationships and our marriages. We work to achieve this
norm and through such actions govern ourselves rather than being governed by an external force.
We choose to make changes to ourselves rather than being forced to act in particular ways.
Venn (1984) states that " ...the norms which psychological discourse constructs and fixes are
those consistent with the dominant form of sociality, that is t~ say that reproduce the social,
intersubjective relations and relations of power as they are played out in social institutions of all
kinds, from the family to the shop floor" (p. 130). Thus psychological knowledge is taken up in
our everyday activities leading to changes in 'who we are'. These changes do not, however,
contradict our accepted social norms and relations. Our failure to meet the psychological norm
leads to a desire for adjustments in our selves. These are achieved by following the techniques
and procedures that are provided by the psychological experts. In this way, it is those who are
experts on the self that allow us to overcome the perceived discrepancy between who we are and
who we desire ourselves to be. In doing so, they reinforce the dominant norms of society by
creating in us the desire to be like that norm. The norm would be constructed as the heterosexual,
married and therefore happy couple and their children with each member performing certain roles
in the family. More detail about the nature of the normal family will be given in the analysis.
This subject as described above is not, therefore, a result of the essential characteristics within
each of us. The question that requires addressing concerns the specific historical circumstances
out of which this notion of the self arose? What social conditions made its emergence possible?
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Venn (1984) notes that the subject of psychology is the ~'unitary, rational subject but that this
notion of subjectivity only begins to appear in western culture from the seventeenth century. It is
the subject-of-science that classical epistemology takes to be the ideal representative of homo
rationalis" (Venn, 1984, p. 121, emphasis original). He continues by suggesting that psychology
aims to maximise the individual responsibility of its subjects and encourage them to make
decisions for themselves. This is clear if vve return to the discourses on domestic violence
considered in chapter two. Individuals are taught not only that they are responsible for the
monitoring of themselves in terms of the psychological norm but also that solutions to the
deviations from these norms should be actively sought rather than imposed by an authority
figure.
Venn (1984) states that the emergence of the unirary, rational and non-contradictory subject
central to this historical epoch stems from two related sources. The first is the birth of modem
science and its value on rationality - most notably from the work of Descartes - and the second is
the emergence of legal rights for the individual. As a result the subject for psychology is both
individualistic and rational. Similarly Rose (1990) suggests that after World War II, a distinction
between the public and the private realm emerged in which the state governed those matters of
public concern but had no right to interfere with :matters of private concern. Thus new methods
were required to ensure that the values of those in authority were upheld within the private
domain. To this end magazines, the media, shops, and many other sources show people who are
happy as people who uphold the dominant values. As a result, we work to construct the lifestyles
portrayed in such discourses. We identify with those confessing and work to match up to the
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norms constructed therein. That is not to say that there is a unitary lifestyle that we all lead.
Rather we choose amongst alternatives, all of which encapsulate the dominant norms and values
of our society. Psychology operates as a technology that deals with conflicts of identity or
selfhood. It helps people to find 'who they really are' and restore their pleasure in the choices
available to them. In this way it produces an individual who is 'free to choose', although the
choices that they have are those that are made available to them through the discourse (in this
case on domestic violence). Similarly, a particular understanding of the subject has become
normalised and deviations from it become pathol.ogical. Thus the notion of 'modem man' (I use
the masculine unashamedly given the masculine values that epitomise the rational, unitary
subject) emerges within a very specific set of circumstances and it is these circumstances that
much psychological theory has failed to take note of. As Venn (1984) states, this new rational
'man' is constructed to have no past, but a natural point of origin. This notion of the subject of
domestic violence is considered to be both natural and normal, rather than historically
constructed.
If domestic violence is historically produced as a problem of self, the obvious question to
consider next is what benefit can be derived fronl the construction of domestic violence in this
particular manner? According to Venn (1984) The psychological focus on the individual is linked
to the specific goals of social regulation. In other words, the self is a useful site for social
regulation. In a similar manner, Rose (1993) considers the production of the self to be central to
what he terms 'advanced liberalism'. He suggests that advanced liberalism has led to a new kind
of governing based on using the criticisms of the welfare state (including, for example, its neglect
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of autonomy). These shortcomings of the welfare state have been used for the benefit of
advanced liberalism. He suggests that advanced liberalism seeks to "govern without governing
society, that is to say, to govern through the regulated and accountable choices of autonomous
agents-citizens, consumers, parents, employees, tnanagers and investors" (Rose, 1993, p. 29,
emphasis original). Following a Rosean approach to domestic violence, we would see the
production of domestic violence in terms of subjectivity as central to the management of
individuals and the reproduction of psychology as a discipline.
Subjectivity And The Psy-Complex
What has begun to become evident is that subjectivity seen as a historical construct can no longer
be viewed as a private matter. Instead it is intensively governed and socially managed (Rose,
1990). To this end, complex technologies have been developed for the management of
subjectivity. What I would suggest is that psychology and, more specifically, the discourse on
domestic violence, is one such technology. Psychology has developed an expertise on
subjectivity and has provided experts to aid people in managing their subjectivity. This has been
done through rendering its subjects calculable and providing the means by which the self is
converted into data (Rose 1988). Psychology is instrumental in developing not only a new
language for conceptualising domestic violence but also making its subjects knowable (Rose
1988). The notion of a subjectivity based on the understanding of the self detailed above has led
to a new language with which we understand ourselves and this understanding in turn influences
the way we act and interact with others. In other 'words, the focus on the self has meant that we
describe our experiences in terms of emotions and feelings. As a result we begin to have a new
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'sense of our selves' (Rose, 1990). What the analysis of this thesis is concerned with is, what role
psychology plays in the production and maintenance of this understanding of subjectivity and the
specific impact of this for women living in abusive relationships. We need to consider that the
power of psychology comes from its ability to construct the self. For example, we must ask how
the various theories of domestic violence help us understand our situation by giving us the
language to explain it.
The central issue that ensured the development of psychology as a discipline was the question of
how individual conduct adapts to social expectations (Rose, 1985). Rose (1985) states that
psychology as a discipline first gained scientific, professional and social status through its
attempts to diagnose and administer "pathologies of conduct" (p. 226). Psychology can therefore
be seen as a technique for the administration of individuals and populations in terms of their
mental attributes and capacities. Abnormality for psychology is not a disease, as in medicine, but
is measured in terms of social apparatus and the aims of government. The abnormal cases upon
which the development of psychology rests were provided by schools, armies, courts and related
institutions. Psychology arose to address the problems of misconduct in these institutions (Rose,
1985).
What i~, therefore, implied is a new form of governmentality. This rests on a notion of power that
differs from the notion of power as described by feminism in chapter two. Rose (1990) suggests
that this new form of governance relies on knowledge regarding its subjects and their
characteristics. Psychology can be seen to provide such knowledge as it has developed a
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language for analysing and explaining the subjects of the modem democratic state. Through the
gathering together, analysing and transcribing of these confessions obtained through the
confessional, subjects of domestic violence become knowable and theories of domestic violence
can be written. These documents of confessions have been the basis of our claim to a scientific
truth, the content of which is the unmentionable that must be admitted to (Foucault, 1979).
The development of such conceptual systems has meant that subjectivity has become
manageable and calculable. According to Rose (1990) psychology has provided new methods for
the old problems of how to educate, cure, reform and punish. Through applying norms and
through the methods of observation, our subjectivity can be translated into data. By providing a
discourse on domestic violence according to which people can begin to monitor and adjust
themselves, they can be educated, cured and gov,erned. As Rose (1985) notes, "health for the
psychology of the individual, is not so much life in the silence of the organs as life in the silence
of the authorities" (p. 231).
The new form of governing allows those in power to act from a distance on individual subjects in
that they need not directly exert control over thern. The new conceptualisation of subjectivity has
also determined what actions are possible for subjects, that is, given that domestic violence is a
problem of self, an expert on the self is required if problems are experienced and one would not
seek medical intervention, for example. As new 'ways of thinking about subjectivity have been
produced, so new techniques for the management of such a subjectivity are made possible. Just
as psychology does not conspire with men to oppress women, it also does not conspire with the
government to create obedient, docile subjects. It addresses very real needs that exist within our
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society, but it also makes certain kinds of solutions possible over others. Rose (1988) states that
"rather than 'the State' extending its control in the nineteenth century, and the psychological
sciences serving such functions for it, we should investigate the formations of a new way of
mobilising political authority in this period, the role played by the psychological sciences in the
birth of a new form of governmental rationality" (p. 182). In other words, rather than psychology
serving the state, a form of governing independent of the state can be conceptualised through
methods and procedures that make various aspec s of our everyday lives calculable and
manageable. I would also not go so far as to say that psychology alone is responsible for this new
mode of governance. Rather, psychology can be ~;een as one of a network of 'technologies of the
self that have the effects of rendering its subject~; knowable and hence governable (Rose, 1992).
Rose (1990) notes the claim.s by libertarians that state intervention into the family is illegitimate
and as such should be limited and clear guidelines established to determine when it is
appropriate. This is due largely to the stigmatisati.on and, on occasions, increasing problems of
the family following state intervention. The intenrentions by social workers have been criticised
as culturally biased, unsubstantiated and too controversial to be warranted. Intervention has,
however, not declined but rather, its nature has evolved. Thus the family is awarded freedom and
privacy except in cases where clear harm is being done. Rose (1990) suggests that this notion of
family privacy is testament to the success of the attempts to construct self-regulating individuals.
In most cases, the law is unnecessary as psychological theory reaches us through a host of other
pathways from the radio phone-in to magazines. The governing of individuals is able to be
effective not through the law but through the prornotion of subjectivity. It is the gap between the
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much publicised normal family and our own reality that leads us to the psychological experts.
What I argue, however, is that domestic violence is an example of legitimate state intervention. It
is one example of a gross social abhoration into 'Nhich state interv~ntion is not only legitimate
but increasingly demanded. This state intervention only operates, however, to reinforce the power
of disciplines like psychology. It acts to feed into and encourage the kind of power that operates
at the level of subjectivity.
The outline of the theory on domestic violence reveals two interesting phenomena. Firstly the
literature on domestic violence is very young, and secondly, it is prolific. Since the emergence of
the subject of psychology, domestic violence and families, have been constructed increasingly in
terms of their "emotional economy" (Rose, 1985, p. 176). That is, we describe our problems in
terms of our feelings and our emotions. According to Rose (1985) psychology as a discipline has
been made possible through the alignments that it has formed between personal happiness,
family relations and social adjustment. Personal happiness has come, through psychology, to be
equated with social adjustment. The family has been awarded a special role in this adjustment as
it is responsible for ensuring the adjustment of the characters of children. Management of
problems in the family, such as violence, is achieved through our psychological relations with the
rest of the family. As domestic violence is a problem of the self, it is addressed through the
management and regulation of our selves. Through this process, the normal family has become
something for which we all strive. Social adjustrnent has become a self-realisation. The notion of
the normal family is derived through studies on the abnormal family. In other words, the studies
in chapter two documenting the abnormal behaviour of some families also define what is normal
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in the family (Rose 1988; Foucault, 1979). It is the ability of psychology to define social
abnormality or socially deviant behaviour in temLS of the psychological functioning of
individuals that Rose (1985) has termed the psychological-complex. Parker, Georgaca, Harper,
McLaughlin and Stowell-Smith (1995) refer to the psy-complex as the "psychologization of
several types of socially undesirable, non-productive behaviours" (p.83). Thus the construction of
domestic violence has in the last 25 years been in increasingly psychological terms and as such,
the psy-complex plays a role in the regulation of socially undesirable behaviour through its
ability to bring people to a more desirable self.
'Power Over' And 'Power To'
Power can thus be seen to operate at two levels. There is what could be termed 'power over'
which represents the state control of grossly antisocial behaviours, such as physical violence,
between parties to a marriage. This notion of povver over can be extended to interpersonal
relationships and as such would be compatible with the feminist notion of power. It is the power
that one group, party or individual has at the expense of another. When a husband abuses his wife
physically, he can be said to have power over her. When the state grants an interdict (as identified
in the Prevention of Family Violence act 133 of 1993) to the abused woman, it is exercising its
power over the husband. At the same time the woman has been given a degree of power over her
husband. In other words the notion of power over can be seen as a speech act of the form 'thou
shalt not' (Foucault, 1980). It assumes the existence of a sovereign subject who says 'no' and a
subject who says 'yes' to the prohibition (Foucault, 1980). I would suggest that power over is
only one form of power and that power can exhibit itself in far more complex and partial ways.
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One cannot stand outside of power in order to analyse it. There are no "spaces of primal liberty
between the meshes of its network" (Foucault, 1980, p. 142). Rather, power in present in our
everyday relations and interactions.
Another notion of power in the form of the psy-complex can, therefore, be conceptualised. This
other notion of power can be called 'power to'. It is this notion of power that has been introduced
above. It is the power to influence others behaviours through inducing them to manage and
control themselves. It is a way of disciplining individuals using self-scrutiny in such a way that
they welcome and embrace it. Drawing on the w-ork of Foucault, Rose (1990) suggests that in
the 16th and 17th centuries, the management of individuals took place through 'policing' and the
development of rules and regulations of behaviour to ensure public safety, happiness and
common good. All aspects of social life were seen to fall under this umbrella of government. The
modem democracy relies on a subject who does not require the state to exercise power over. The
limits of state intervention into the family rests on the assumption that individuals have the
internal capacity to govern themselves. More spe:cifically, this is seen in the literature on
domestic violence that assumes an autonomous self-regulating agent. In an earlier article, Rose
(1988) states that "such practises also, and more characteristically, seek actively to produce
subjects of a form, to mould, shape, and organise the psyche, to fabricate individuals with
particular desires and aspirations" (p. 196).
Through the spread of the psy-complex into the newly delineated area of domestic violence, our
subjectivity is described in such a manner that w1e are expected to care for and be responsible for
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ourselves. As it is we who govern the choices that we make, we can live the life that we choose
and be the kind of people we choose. In considering power in this manner we can begin to
consider '"all the ways in which the conduct of goverrunent was linked to the government of
conduct" (Barry, Osbome and Rose, 1996, p. 212). We need, in other words, to look at the ways
that subjectivity and identity have become linked to political aims. Barry, Osborne and Rose
(1996) note that there are numerous, plans, programmes and policies that are concerned with our
conduct in relationships, our values and our identities. The expansion of the psy-complex into the
area of domestic violence can thus be seen as a political activity in that it has the ability to instil
self-governing behaviour within us, that is, it has power to. From this perspective, we can begin
to see that the literature on domestic violence is powerful in its ability to encourage people to
monitor and adjust their behaviour in terms of social norms.
Foucault (1980) states that the feminist notion of power is limited as it sees power is repressive
and restricting. If this is the way that power works, he asks, why do people accept or obey
power? He suggests rather that power produces things and gives us pleasure. He states that "it
(power) needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social
body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression" (Foucault, 1980, p.
119). Domestic violence can be seen to have 'colne out' in the last 25 years. It is no longer
hidden or taboo. This coming out is the positive aspect of power that cannot be analysed using
the concept of power over. Furthermore, it is povver to that is the basis of power over. This begins
to suggest that feminism is a resistance that is merely a recodification of the notion of state
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power. As such it leaves the capillaries of power (power to) undetected. Power to is effective
precisely because of its ability to get productive service from individuals.
Foucault (1980,1984) uses the metaphor of the panopticon to illustrate his notion of power. It
consists of a central tower surrounded by a ring of cells. The overseer in the tower is able, due to
backlighting in the cells, to see all people in the cells. The assumption is, then that if people are
visible, the speech, opinions and gaze of others vvould be sufficient to regulate them and take
away their desire to do wrong or commit harm. "Power will be exercised by virtue of the mere
fact of things being known and people being seen in a sort of immediate, collective and
autonomous gaze" (Foucault, 1980, p. 154).This system is less expensive than power over in that
it minimises the resistance that is an inevitable response to harsh repression. The result of this
gaze is that people interiorise it and oversee thenlselves. If each person is watched by all others,
we can see that power cannot be seen to belong to one group (Gordon, 1980). The aim of this
thesis is not to judge or subvert the power of the psy-complex but to expose it as a form of power





Famsa is the Family and Marriage Society of South Africa. It offers a range of services including,
marriage and relationship, family, and individual counselling as well as offering legal aid advice
and mediation. In 1994, the social workers at Farnsa, Pietermaritzburg, began to realise that a
great many of their clients were women who were living with abusive partners. It was felt that a
problem of this magnitude needed to be addressed in a manner that reached the greatest number
of women in practical ways. Having recognised this need, the WIN (Women in Need) project
was developed in 1995. The project began with a Rally held in 1995 that was attended by 100
women and that aimed to raise awareness of doIttestic violence and bring women together to get
the project off the ground. From this rally, the first group of25 volunteers were recruited. These
- '"
were women from a variety of ethnic, racial and socio-economic backgrounds who were trained
to facilitate support groups for women who were suffering abuse by their partners. Many of the
women had themselves been in abusive relationships and their experiences and insights were
welcomed. ,g was decided that community based facilitators were needed to run such support
groups. From 1996 a training manual was developed and the support groups were running
successfully. The groups are based on a 'bottom up' approach to educating and supporting
~
women in abusive relationships so that they are able to take increased responsibility for
themselves. ~om this point onwards the support group system grew and many of the women
who had been in previous groups now facilitate their own support groups. The project has also
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extended into other projects based on the issues and difficulties that the women identified in the
groups. lAWS (Justice and Women) is a project that has developed to help women obtain more
effective access to the justice system such as helping them to obtain interdicts and maintenance.
Similarly there is now a 'haven' in Pietermaritzburg where women whose safety is threatened
may stay and receive counselling and support. An educational programme has also been set up at
the gynaecological clinic at Northdale hospital to teach women about their rights in relationships
as well as to increase awareness of the programme. In the short time that the WIN project has
operated it has resulted in a network of dedicated workers and activists in the field.
Setting Up The Research
I had run support groups of this nature since the outset of the support group system and the first
step in conducting this research was thus to nego' iate with the director of Famsa,
Pietermaritzburg about using one of the groups for research purposes. I then requested the
permission of the woman who would co-facilitate the group and discussed the research with her.
I discussed the research with the women in the group at our first meeting and requested their
permission to tape record the sessions. When introducing the project to the women in the group I
was surprised that they did not demand more information from me than what I had given them.
With hindsight I can guess that they perhaps felt that they were not able to say no to the research.
- I was introduced to them as the 'psychologist in training' and the initial sessions could have been
influenced by this. My relationship with the worn.en in this group was initially quite different to
the relationships I have had with women in other groups. They demanded far more 'solutions' to
their problems from me and did not want to accept that I knew no more than them about their
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experiences given my apparent 'expertise'. I was, however, struck by what they identified as their
need to help others and reach out to other women. As the time went on, they became increasingly
excited and interested in the research and talked of the way it could prevent other women from
entering abusive relationships like theirs. I developed an immense respect for them and the
potential risk to their own safety that they were vvilling to take for the sake of other women. .
After having introduced the research topic and content to the women who were joining the group,
I set up one-to-one interviews with each of them to be held before the second group session. This
was an attempt to consider how they felt about their experiences of domestic violence before
their encounter with the group in order to see whether their perceptions had changed significantly
by the end of the sessions and if so, in what ways.
Ethos Of The Research
Feminist researchers, according to Bograd, (1988) ask different questions from traditional
researchers. For example, instead of asking a WOlnan why she stays in an abusive relationship,
one would ask what it is that prevents her from leaving. In this way we must be continually
vigilant to avoid victim blaming. Mainstream questioning is often based on gender stereotypes
and these, as well as current theories, need to be challenged through our questioning. I would
extend this argument to suggest that not only do our specific interview' schedules differ, but also
the kinds of research projects that we undertake and the research questions we phrase differ from
traditional research. A feminist piece of research would not, for example, attempt to 'discover'
the underlying personality traits of women who are battered-unless the social and political value
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of such a discovery could be convincingly argued.
Because different questions are asked, different nlethodologies are usually employed. According
to Bograd (1988) we should be aware that it may be our objective, fixed format questionnaires
that cause bias in our research by misrepresenting women. Feminists should prefer open-ended
questioning which allows the categories to emerge from the data. She further adds that we must
remain self-critical about our choice of research rnethods. Bograd (1988) states that there is no
neutral, objective and value-free science for research that takes place in a patriarchal society. Not
discussing our biases in research means simply that they go undetected, not that we are or can
ever be without them. Our bias in research should be made explicit and our ideologies
acknowledged.
The issues, which Bograd raises, gives a somewhat different slant to the age-old
'qualitative/quantitative' debate. Yllo (1988) suggests that the social sciences have suffered from
'physics envy' which has resulted in an over reliance on quantitative methods in the social
sciences. She warns against the stereotype that quantitative methods are masculine and
qualitative methods are feminine. In quoting Bacon, she says that expressions like "let us
establish a chaste and lawful marriage between Inind and nature" construct the mindJknower as
masculine and the nature/known as feminine (cited in Yllo, 1988, p. 37). She argues instead for a
question oriented approach that transcends such stereotypes. In developing a methodology, my
focus was, therefore~ on its appropriateness rather than its conformity. For this reason it was
decided that the process of a support group would be followed as this approach would allow me
to best answer how it is that psychology is able to play a role in the construction of our
subjectivity. Emerson Dobash and Dobash (1988) take a somewhat stronger stand on the issue
and state that "we explicitly rejected the use of the survey methods employing large probability
samples that must invariably use superficial questionnaires and interviews based on abstract
categories relating to preconceived and, in our view, irrelevant issues (p. 56). This is a belief
reiterated by Bograd (1988) and for this reason she suggests that by focusing on the categories
that the subjects use, we are able to challenge our existing ones that claim to represent all
experiences. Here the work of Riley (1988) becOlnes especially important. She problematises the
very category women and notes its reliance on essentialist thinking. In doing so, she reminds us
that the most taken for granted aspects of our everyday lives must continually be subject to
scrutiny. As Stanley and Wise (1990) suggest, we must continually refuse to play the "women are
...game" (p. 40).
Yllo (1988) goes on to state that science is a source of power rather than a source of truth. It is
structured by dichotomies such as rational/irrational, objective/subjective and
masculine/feminine. The positivist paradigm's association with masculinity is what has given it
prestige. As an example she considers the Conflict Tactics Scale used in many of the studies
described in chapter two. This scale counts incidences of violence without consideration for
severity and thus renders results such as "1.8 million wives are physically abused by their
husband each year (3.8%) while (the) nearly two million husbands are physically abused by their
wives (4.6%)" (Yllo, 1988, p. 40). This dubious finding shows the ways in which statistics can
bias findings. Nevertheless, it is these statistics that hold the most influence with policy makers
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due to their prestige. In addition, Emerson Dobash and Dobash (1988) suggest that scales like the
Conflict Tactics Scale make use of badly conceived of categories of violence, ignore issues like
the injuries sustained, and ignore the systematic violence shown towards women by men. The
findings of the Conflict Tactics Scale contradict the experiences of the service providers who are
overwhelmed by the numbers of abused women, but these experiences are not given the same
value as statistics as their argument is said to be unscientific. Emerson Dobash and Dobash
(1988) suggest that this leads to a flow of knowledge from the 'scientist' to the worker in the
field as opposed to the other way around. This ignores the subjective experiences of women as
they are reported to the workers in the field. StanIey and Wise (1990) suggest further that
objectivity must be challenged as it cannot be separated from subjectivity. Rather than attempt to
avoid or marginalise subjectivity we should welcome subjective accounts and make them the
focus of our research.
As a researcher into domestic violence, I was not emotionally detached and value-free. Rather, I
was hoping to use the research for a specific purpose and had a vested interest in its ability to
make some kind of change to knowledge in the field. The research is t~us for women, not about
them and my political aims and methods cannot and should not be disconnected from the
research process. My methodology was influenced by the above criticisms of past research. I took
a qualitative approach to see how subjectivity was constructed in therapy through language. This
referred not only to the subjectivity of the women in the group but my own and the ways in
which my sense of self influenced theirs.
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To conclude this argument, I draw in the work of Stanley and Wise (1990). They suggest that a
feminist ethos should be present in the following aspects of research: "In the researcher-
researched relationship, in emotion as a research experience, in the intellectual autobiography of
researchers; therefore in how to manage the differing 'realities' and understandings of
researchers and researched; and thus in the complex question of power in research and writing"
(Stanley and Wise, 1990, p. 23). I have thus made every attempt in the limited space available to
elaborate on the interactions between myself and the women being interviewed, how the
interviews have affected my life and feelings personally, and how my and their background and
past experiences colour the ways in which we interact and the power relations inherent to these
interactions. These principles cannot simply be reflected on in writing a report but require
reflection throughout the research process and adjustments to methodology and assumptions need
to be made where required.
The Interviewees
Patton (1990) states that the logic of qualitative sampling rests on an in depth look at the
phenomenon at hand. It is thus purposive; searching for information rich as opposed to
representative samples. My aim in following a single support group was thus to look in depth at a
typical case. For this reason, the sample size was less important than the quality of data obtained
from the research. The sample was decided on with the purpose of the study clearly at hand. That
is, I wanted, not to develop traditionally generalisable results but to trace the process of a
complete group over time with a focus on the details of the discussions held during the support
groups. This is not to suggest that the results and perhaps methods of this study will not be
transferred to other studies. The extent of the generalisation in this study would therefore be if
other researchers were to employ a similar approach in evaluating their practice or that of others.
It was hoped that this approach would allow me to capture any changes in attitude and belief that
occurred as a result of the support group process. The generalisability of the present study can
therefore be determined by its perceived social worth. Generalisability would therefore be from
case to case rather than from case to population (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
The following are brief descriptions of the women in the group, based on my personal
impressions of them and their initial presenting problems.
Mary is a middle class white woman in her mid twenties. She has a small girl and
was pregnant at the time of the support group. She has since had a son. She felt that her husband
had a history of psychological problems such as depression and insecurity, which were now
affecting her and her child. She did not feel that he was acting in a way that was appropriate for a
new father. He spent a lot of time with his friends of whom she did not always approve and he
was controlling and domineering over her.
Sushi: Sushi is a Hindu woman who has been married a long time. Her husband is
extremely violent and has stabbed her on more than one occasion. She does not work and
depends entirely on him for money. He is particularly abusive when he has been drinking which
he does regularly. She feels that his abuse makes her violent and insensitive towards her children.
Krishne: Krishne is a Muslim woman in her forties. She has been married for sixteen years.
For thirteen years she was homeless and slept with friends in the night and spent days in parks
with her three children. During this time her husband was almost entirely absent. Her husband is
not physically violent towards her but gambles excessively, which she feels is contrary to their
religious beliefs. He has not worked in the time they have been married and she has supported the
family entirely by sewing and buying household goods cheaply and reselling them for a profit.
She has recently been granted a municipal house that she is paying off. Although she wants to
own the house she cannot as she is married in community of property. She is afraid that as soon
as the house is paid off, her husband will throw her out.
Fatima: Fatima is also in her forties. This is her second marriage and she is married
according to Hindu law. Her husband drinks excessively and is extremely violent. She too has
been stabbed by him on more than one occasion. He is continually unfaithful to her and she is
afraid that she may contract sexually transmitted diseases from him. She is extremely self-
conscious about not having been educated (she has a grade 5) and not reading or writing well. He
continually wakes her at night when he comes home and is drunk. It is usually at these times that
she is physically or sexually abused.
lane: lane is a coloured woman who has a high social status in her community. She is a
very strong Christian and most of her social interaction comes from the church. She has recently
been divorced which resulted from her husband being unfaithful to her. She continually receives
obscene and harassing phone calls from the woman he now lives with. She feels that she has
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been unable to overcome her divorce and the fact that he was unfaithful to her for most of their
married life.
Sue: Sue is a white woman in her forties. She too is divorced as a result of her
husband's infidelity. She is a Christian woman whose religion has a large influence in her life.
She takes the role of helping other women as a result of her experiences.
The Interviews
One-on-one interviews were initially conducted v,ith all the women except Sue who preferred not
to be interviewed. A hand held dictaphone was used. The questionnaire was largely unstructured
and I began each interview by telling the women that I wanted to get an understanding of where
they were coming from and what had brought them to the support groups. I thus aimed to get an
uI?-derstanding at two levels. Firstly I wanted to know about what their experiences were and their
understandings of these experiences. To this end, interviewing involved asking questions such as
what is abuse for you and what kinds of abuse do you suffer, why does abuse happen to women
in general, and who does it happen to? I also wanted to know about the tactics that they had tried
to solve their problem in the past and how they thought that the issue of domestic violence
should be dealt with.
After I had interviewed the women, each of the ei.ght support group sessions were recorded. Each
session dealt with a different topic. The fi!'st sessi.on looked at who gets abused and what acts
could be defined as abusive. We then went on to look at the cycle of violence (Walker, 1984) and
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women were invited to identify with or dissociate from this. We also considered topics such as
emotional abuse, anger and depression, self-esteem building and legal options available to
battered women. Other related topics were dealt \vith if they were identified as necessary by the
women.
One of the primary difficulties that I faced in the interviews was how to ask women to tell
personal and painful experiences to me. A balance had to be struck between being sensitive and









Mm. Mm. So urn am I right then that when things got really bad, then you came to
FAMSA?
Ja. Ja.
So (.) How did you come to FAM.SA.
I looked it up in the phone book.
Oh, so you just ...
I just looked it up.
OK.
What I had been trying to ask Mary was what incidents led to her seeking help from Famsa. In
my attempts to be sensitive and subtle, I was conlpletely incomprehensible and the conversation
died completely. With time I felt that the best tactic was to admit when I felt uncomfortable about
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asking someone a question and encourage them to respond only to what they felt comfortable
with. I also found on repeated occasions that I had to admit ignorance to what they were talking
about. This was particularly acute when the language or cultural differences between us meant





Alright, so it sounds like what you~ re wanting is him to be there in the home and
to be an affectionate partner and the gambling's becoming a problem.
The gambling is becoming a problem because ifhe starts gambling and he's
losing he starts chasing. Well I've learnt that word over the years -
I don't know what it really-I don't know what that means=
=means. When you start chasing, now you've got to borrow money from this
person and that person and you're chasing your money, you're trying to recover it,
so that's the term they use for chasing the money and they go on borrowing and
borrowing and borrowing. That goes and he has to start paying that back as well.
So, it's quite a strain financially as well.
I felt that my honesty and ignorance helped the women to feel relaxed and broke down some of
the power relations that I felt had been constructed when I first met them. I felt that these
admissions meant that the women were more wiBing to bring me to some kind of understanding
of the way they saw their circumstance as opposed to relying on my advice as the'expert' .
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Oakley (1981) identified the difficulties in interviewing women following the mainstream
techniques. She suggests that we are taught not to focus attention on the person doing the
interviewing, the interview, how the interviewees feel and the social relationships that develop
from such interviews. She criticised this traditional paradigm for being masculine. Interviewing
is seen as a method of data collection with the interaction skills of a personal conversation. In
other words it has been accepted that treating your interviewees in a friendly, warm manner is
necessary for extracting your information. As interviewers, we are warned against becoming too
personally involved with those whom we interview. We are also not prepared for the kinds of
questions which interviewees may ask back and the responses we are asked to give to such
questions are patronising, for example, "I'm here to learn, not to pass judgement" (Oakley, 1981,
p. 35). It is recommended that we give out no personal information. All this is done in the name
of avoiding biasing the responses of the subjects. The interviewer should ideally be a recording
device and the interviewee a data producing machine. The interviewer is also, however, the
expert analyst and the power relations between the interviewer and the interviewer are thus
hierarchical. That which is proper interviewing, is that which follows the masculine values of
detachment and objectivity. Women are passive, submissive, subordinate and to be exploited
through research. Oakley (1981) suggests that psychology, like the rest of society does not look at
interviewing from the perspective of women.
For the purposes of this research, I took such fenainist claims seriously. Questions from the
women were welcomed on any topic from my ovm experiences of male violence, to my views on
marriage and families, to questions regarding the use to which the research would be put. I felt
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that it would be unethical to expect them to share with me intimate and potentially dangerous
information (which it would be if, for example, I was to break confidentiality) whilst I remained
detached and thus emotionally safe. I was asking a lot of the wom~n about a topic that many of
them felt afraid, ashamed and defensive about, and I felt that it was the least I could do to answer
the questions that they asked me. This gave me some insight into how difficult it is to trust
strangers with personal information and the possible consequences of not respecting their need
for confidentiality. In addition, allowing me to interview them often cut into their busy schedule
and some interviews had to be done whilst we fed children or attended to other jobs. In addition,
the long term and personal contact between us meant that it was impossible for friendships not to
develop between us and these were welcomed. Vie still see each other socially or in times of
cnsIs.
The women were told that I was the only person to ever hear the tapes and that no one else would
see transcripts that contained any identifying information. They were told of the possibility that
some of the research may be published. I attempted to answer their questions as fully as possible
making it clear where my responses were no more than personal opinions. This meant often
admitting that I had no answers. I hoped in this \vay that they would also get some satisfaction
from the personal relationship that developed amongst us. This is in keeping with the feminist
demand that we re-evaluate our relationships with others and the values of the interviewing
process (Oakley, 1981). Clearly then, it would go without saying that avoiding emotional
attachment with the women in the support group was not possible, nor desirable in this project. I
had become intimately involved in their lives and in a few cases, those of their families.
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It was also essential in my analysis of the transcripts that I remained aware that the women were
interacting with me as a young, white, middle class, educated woman. The issue of me being very
young for the work I was doing came up towards the end of the group session and a few said that
they felt apprehensive about my age when they first saw me. Similarly, when we knew each other
better, it seemed that a few had felt uneasy about the taping but not felt in a position to say so. I
was introduced to them as a 'psychologist in trai ing' and the power hierarchy was clearly not
equal despite my attempts to follow a feminist ethos at all times. I feel that feminist approaches
thus are useful as they provide a method of remaining critical, not only of one's interpretation of
the problem but also of one's approach to it.
Data Management
At the end of the interviews and support group sessions, I had 22 hours of tape that was
transcribed by myself and somebody within the group who wanted to earn the money. All the
women were told how I went about transcribing and that the tapes would be destroyed at the end
of the project. They were also told that all identifying information about themselves or anyone
they spoke of would be changed. Sample transcripts were taken to the women so that they could
be reassured that they were not identifiable. Some of the initial themes were also fed back to
them at the end of the sessions.
The transcription conventions were used as listed in Potter and Wetherall (1987). A pause was
indicated by the following symbol (.) and where this pause in speech was long, the number of
seconds of silence were written in the brackets, for example (3). An interruption in a sentence
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was indicated by an = sign at the end of the interrupted sentence and the beginning of the
interruption. Words in double brackets indicate actions that are relevant but not noticeable in the
transcripts such as laughing. I used words in brackets within the text to elaborate on what the
person had said if it was unclear. Words emphasised or said loudly were put in capital letters. For
example,
FATIMA: At first when I really met him (4) The first time when I met him he poked
(stabbed) me on my head here. ((Pointing)) He gave me ten stitches on my head.
TEN STITCHES he gave me. And er I told him I said you know what, when I
saw the blood, I said you know what I took all this from my previous marriage and
I'm not prepared to go through it again. And that's the case and now you'd better
leave. I don't want to see you again. Yet I told him so many times, you know. You
can go. He waited for thirteen years to ruin my life (.) spoil it and now he must go.
(.) His own friends comes and tell me that how he's going out with other women,
how he comes into town and pick up all this dirty womens (prostitutes) With his
part time money we can do so much it, but he don't give me his part time money-
those are his wages and with his \\'ages I see to all the accounts. I see for the
whole month that he has a packet of cigarettes every day and good lunch. And his
part time money whatever part tirn.e job he does, the money he makes, when he









You see, ifhe's taking us out for a day or maybe taking us to the beach, or to the
dam or something he invites all his friends=
=So it's not a family =
=And they all must be with us so 'iVhich means, if I go, I must have about R200 to
R300 to buy and feed all of them.
Analysis
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) liken the qualitative researcher to a bricoleur, as the choice of
research tools is not set in advance but pieced together depending on the question to be asked.
They state that "the product of the bricoleur's labour is a bricolage, a complex, dense, reflexive,
collagelike creation that represents the researcher's understandings, and interpretations of the
world or phenomenon under analysis" (p. 3, emphasis original). Accordingly, my approach to the
analysis could not be detennined by a pre-existing set of procedures. Patton (1990) argues that
there can only be guidelines that can be followed in analysing qualitative data and that these
should be applied creatively using sound judgement.
Although the choice to use discourse analysis was relatively straightforward, the different kinds
of discourse analysis abound depending on the theoretical framework from which one works
(Bunnan, 1991). My first step in analysing these ranscripts was to read and re-read making notes
to myself about any themes that seemed to be occurring and their possible significance. I found it
most useful to note a series of questions to 'ask' the text.
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Given that I was interested in the political nature of the self and in problematising the presenting
understanding of the self, I felt that the critical guidelines outlined by both Parker (1992) and
Burman (1991) would be most useful. Parker (1992) states that discourses are used to do things
in an interaction. Depending on the function required (for example wanting to present oneself as
non-sexist) our speech will vary. Discourses do not, therefore, describe the world neutrally but
classify it, bringing some aspects of our social reality into sight \vhilst concealing others. In this
way, discourse becomes a framework for debating the value of one version of reality over another
as is seen in the debates discussed in chapter two.
My next step was thus to re-read the transcripts asking myself why the person chose to say what
they did and not something else. Why this account of their experience and not a competing
account? Why is therapy about the self and not about how to keep oneself safe given that so
many of the women were living in situations where their lives were in danger? I also asked
myself what was being left out of their account of their experience and why. Were some things
left out on the assumption that I already knew them or were they left out for other significant
reasons? At Parker's (1992) suggestion I used free-association to explore some of the possible
connotations of what was being said.
Parker's (1992) guidelines are compatible with the approach of Foucault (which Burman
identifies as only one approach to discourse analysis) that "takes discourse as a social practice,
and as constitutive of the construction and shifting grounds of frameworks of meaning-including
knowledge of ourselves, our subjectivities" (Buffilan, 1991, p. 326). Using these assumptions as
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well as those of Rose (as outlined in the theory of this thesis), I was in a better position to read
texts critically and identify themes in terms of their ability to regulate and discipline. The
Foucauldian approach is especially useful for my purposes given the questions it asks about
subjectivity. I thus asked, whilst reading the texts, what kinds of subjectivities were possible
given the constraints of our language around dornestic violence? How do the concepts we have
regulate people into acceptable social behaviour and, most importantly, what are the links
between the self and power, that is, who benefits from this conceptualisation of the self (Parker,
19 ·9, 1992)? Linked to this I then asked who the discourse addresses, is it women, violent men,
psychologists etc.? My next step was to try to critique the picture of the world that I had painted
and test the extent to which this picture was resilient to such critique (Miles and Huberman,
1984).
Given the approach taken to this analysis, I could not possibly claim to represent the 'reality of
domestic violence'. My interest in the self as it is constructed through therapy emerged as I
facilitated support groups over a couple of years. I, therefore, approached the text with these
questions already in mind. I clearly then will have left out other significant themes in the data. In
a sense it could be said that my analysis had begun before the data had even been collected. My
focus then can only be seen as one attempt to render comprehensible a complex field of inquiry.
Atkinson (1992) states that "the comprehensible representation of social worlds is (therefore)
produced via a kind of "symbolic violence" (cited in Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977).
Understanding is always bought at the expense of fidelity to the phenomena" (p. 14). Thus my
analysis must be seen as accurate at one level, but always unfaithful to domestic violence on
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another in that the logical sequence required to present it coherently cannot do justice to the
complexity of the subject.
CHAPTEFt FIVE
SUBJECTIVITY
In this chapter I hope to show how the data collected for this project has led me to the
understanding of subjectivity which has been briefly outlined in chapter three. I will show the
ways in which the women in the group explained their sense of self and the changes that they felt
were necessary to reach happiness and fulfilment. I also aim to extend this argument to consider
the specific ways in which the women are constructed in terms of their roles as mother and wife,
that is, how the subjectivity of a woman is constru ted in a unique manner. For the purposes of
this analysis, the homo rationalis described in chapter three requires further analysis. The
psychological understanding of the subject attributes specific roles to men and women. The
categories of men and women are used to play a role in the transmission of the dominant norms
of society as they are reinforced by psychology. W·omen have a unique and central role in
ensuring that the notion of a unified, rational subject is reproduced and as such constructed as
normal.
The Psychological Self
Rose (1990) suggests that psychological expertise has provided us with a new language for
constructing our selves. We understand our selves in increasingly psychological terms which
include new ways of understanding the way we feel, our emotions, hopes and so on. This new
sense of ourselves directly influences the way we act as well as the way we interact with others.
Consider the following extract.
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ASHA: He'll never, never do it. He's that kind of a person. And (.) it (.) it's difficult
(.) I mean although I have accepted that I (.) there's no way he's going to change,
but what I actually need is support. Somebody who can understand what I'm
going through and it's difficult to get that somebody.
Here Asha describes the kind of person that her husband is (or is not). His identity is described in
terms of the psychological characteristics that he exhibits. By referring to the 'kind of person'
that he is she focus the problem around his subjectivity, his self and the ways in which it is
lacking. Similarly, her solution to the problem involves seeking out someone who can meet her
emotional needs. The solution is thus also framed in psychological terms. The following four





That's a minor sort of thing and generally every Christmas time, every Easter
holiday, every birthday, every time there's a major holiday of some sort, he urn
gets very depressed and takes things out on me. I think it's got to do with his
childhood or something.
I find his love very conditional.








You know what I mean? It's not like (.) It's not quite stuff that you do (.) It's
feelings and thoughts and almost working through
They're very aware (.) they are (children) (.) I think it's associated to (.) Man and
by the time they're five years old and 7 years old or whatever their
personality is pretty well formed.
la.
I'm actually just not prepared to sit around for five years waiting for my husband
to come to his senses, because by that time the damage is done.
la. la.
If we accept Parker's (1989) premise that we construct our reality through language, then the
problems that Mary and her husband are experiencing are constructed in psychological terms. It
is his depression and his childhood that are problematic. More than this, however, they are both
constructed as psychological selves and the focus is, therefore, on 'feelings', 'working through'
and 'personalities'. The language that Mary uses to describe her experiences is taken from
psychological theory as are her understandings of the effects of her husbands behaviour. Rather
than being described as a social or legal issue, dornestic violence is an issue of a failure of one
party to live up to his psychological responsibility. In other words, Mary's husband fails to 'work
through' feelings and emotions and offers only conditional love. His psychological self is thus
seen to be lacking. In the process of describing her husband's lack, Mary also defines a 'normal
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psychological self. It is one where love is unconditional and problems are solved through
working on feelings and emotions.
The increasing construction of domestic violence in psychological terms stems from
psychology's general permeation through society. It is not necessarily psychologists that 'teach'
women to explain violence in psychological terms. In other words, the tendency to see one's
problems in psychological terms should not be considered to be a direct consequence of
psychology as a discipline nor an effect of psychologists. Rather, these psychological
explanations address individuals in all areas of interaction in their lives. We hear these emotional
and other psychological explanations in all arenas of our lives from soap operas to radio phone-
ins; from self-help books to advice columns. This allows for all to use these concepts and terms,
as opposed to them being exclusively for use by psychologists. Doctors, mothers, teachers,
magazines and friends, all construct our problems of living as problems requiring a psychological
explanation.





I heard something very interesting on the radio a little while ago. I can't









Basically saying that when you choose a partner in life, subconsciously you
choose somebody whose got a problem, or the relationship will have some sort of
problem that you have had in the past that you weren't able to deal with, and
because you naturally want to deal with it so you put yourself in situations so it
can=
=Ja. ja=
=force you to deal with your situation.
This extract illustrates one of the many diverse ways in which psychological understandings of
domestic violence can be transmitted. I am not suggesting that it is psychologists who make us
see the world in psychological terms. Rather, these psychological understandings of domestic
violence are adopted by many that are in contact \vith the field, including doctors, radio hosts and
writers of popular psychology. Psychological understandings of domestic violence are so central
that even those who are not psychologists can only identify it as being a psychological problem.
Domestic violence is so saturated with the psy-complex that it can only be explained in
psychological terms. Note how Mary describes it as 'natural' to put oneself in situations where
problems are worked on. The psychological techniques for working on problems are not
acknowledged as historical constructions but are the natural or proper responses to perceived
abnormality in a relationship. This is not to suggest that without psychological explanations of
domestic violence men would not hit, degrade or sexually assault their wives, but this would not
be a psychological problem. It would not be a problem of a psychological nature and thus would
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not require addressing from a psychological perspective. By constructing domestic violence as a
psychological problem, a need for psychological services is created. The next extract illustrates
the ways in which psychology has become indispensable to us. In this extract, Krishne is talking
about the build up of tension and stress in her relationship.
KRISHNE: It (the tension) builds up. It's something that you need to talk about
immediately because mine had built up into quite a state - as I said to you. You
have to have help - there is no su(:h thing as dealing with it without help - I
know for a fact I never complained~ and you virtually learn to start realising the
symptoms and seek help again.
This extract followed a discussion of emotional abuse. Here, Krishne makes it clear that
emotional issues require' dealing with'. The women go on to discuss how emotional abuse can
be worse than physical abuse because of the dire psychological effects of being emotionally
abused. Although many of the women have experienced extreme violence, their problems are
none the less constructed as those that have to do \vith emotions and feelings almost to the
exclusion of other possible constructions. It would, for example, seem quite possible that
domestic violence could be constructed as a problem of personal, physical safety instead of the
kind of person one is or wants to be. A need is therefore created for those who are 'experts' in the
field of the self, that is, those who are knowledgeable about psychological issues. The women
monitor themselves for signs that their emotions are damaged and that emotional 'experts' may
need to be consulted.
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More than this, however, this extract begins to expose some of the assumptions that exist about
the nature of this self. The individual is identified as the one who seeks help. It is she who must
identify the symptoms that something is wrong in the relationship and actively work to reverse
the problem. That is, psychological explanations of domestic violence rest on a specific
understanding of the self, who one is. Cruikshank (1996), in evaluating self-esteem workshops,
makes a similar point. She suggests that in the process of writing, a self is constructed upon
which one can act in order to achieve resolution of the problem. In other words, writings on
domestic violence such as those described in chapt1er two are not only based on a notion of the
self; this self and its administration is our responsibility. Through the construction of this self, we
are given a site on which we can work in order to achieve our goals. The assumption underlying
this construction of domestic violence is that we all know the kind of person that we are and we
monitor and compare this self continually. Consider the following extract.
ASHA: He sits like er we don't watch TV together at home when he comes from work.
He does his own thing. He sits, if w1e are in the lounge, he sits in the room. He's a
referee and he has a whole lot of work to do, so he takes it out and he sits and
looks at his papers and he never sits to have supper with us, or he got no time for
the children and er if we come out of the lounge and go into the room he goes to
watch TV. There's no time that we spend together. But er now that he knows I'm
coming for help he sits with us. He pays a bit of attention to the children as well






Alright that's quite interesting that "t's a front. Do you believe then that he 'vvill go
back to how he 'vvas?
Definitely.
Definitely. How would you like to see your relationship?
I'd like him to change. I mean I told him over the years all I need from him is a
please, thank you, be there for me. I don't need him to do things for me. I don't
children. That's what I actually need, and his gambling. That'"s also a burden to us.
This extracts provides the counsellor with an illustration of the kind of person that Asha's
husband is. The problem is set up as a problem of self. Her husband is not the kind of person that
he should be. He does not, in other words, live up to the norm of what a husband should be. In
order for their relationship to be happy and fulfille:d, he needs to change his self. Rose (1990)
suggests that this normal self is defined in various ways. We receive messages about what is
normal from the publicised confessions around domestic violence as well as from other
discourses about the family. In other words, the increasing literature on domestic violence and
the increasing awareness that has been created from our contact with this literature provides us
with a norm according to which we can evaluate ourselves, our relationships and our families. It








You see, when (.) It started affecting me immediately because I come from a (.) I
was a very quiet person. If you were to hear me talk you had to come close.
Mm...Mm...
You had to come very close to hear what I am saying. And um it affected me in
such a way it made me vulgar. It rnade me violent. It made me want to be violent.
In fact I hurt myself too - I cut my hands and I used to break the window and all
that (.) with my hands I used to become so violent, but I didn't know it was a
problem. I never knew that this is what is causing it. And urn I used to abuse
him too, I didn't know how to take out my anger. I used to shout at him and
call him names and after it I used to become ashamed of it and I started suffering
with headaches and er it just went on for quite a long time, when I say 12 years,
only after 12 years seeked help. And er I ended up in intensive care and then they
asked me why did I have high blood pressure, what was my problem - am I having
problems, or whatever. I was too ashamed to tell them that-
Again we see that the psychological approach taken to the problem of domestic violence leads to
a discussion of one's self. The self that one constructs in therapy is monitored according to a
psychological norm. The description given is of what a normal family and relationship should be.
The husband's subjectivity is monitored and found in this case to be lacking. Similarly, in
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describing her self prior to therapy, Asha sees this self as not living up to normal behaviour. The
discrepancy between the existing self and the desired self provides the space in which one can
begin to see oneself differently. This dichotomy, in other words, allows us to see the self as
changeable and in so doing provides a space for action. We are able to work on the self given that
it is changeable. Because the problem is constructed in terms of the self, the wanting self is
perceived to require attention. The solution that provides relief from their abnormal situation is,
predictably, therapy. Wilbraham (1997) states tha.t by formulating the problem in psychological
terms, it can be seen as a therapeutic opportunity. In other words it is an opportunity to work on
the problems and move past them. We can thereD)fe be seen as entrepreneurs as we identify the
need for this work and set up the conditions for this work. It is we who manage and work on the
self. We are the managers of our selves and work to create a more normal self.
What then is defined as this psychological norm? The following discussion occurred when the
women were describing the ways in which other people often blamed them for the abuse that
they were suffering or failed to notice it.
ASHA: You've got a very valid point, because there's something I want to add to what
you have just said. As with your life I accepted the fact that's the way my husband
is, but I needed help and I came here. I learned something, I think, for the first
time in my life for many, many years I'm really happy. I'm not putting on a show
to say I'm smiling, it's great. I am really happy. The thing is I sat down and I





change our positions. There's no such thing as we cannot change it. But what
we can - what we don't want to c:hange it's our decision. As I said I didn't want
to change my position, but I was also making my husband unhappy. Although I
didn't want to change this position that I am in I know for a fact, er because I have
been here also, a couple of weeks - three weeks I think I have been=
Mm. Mm.
= and I've become more like the person I used to be before I married him, and I
can see my husband is happy as well. It's making me happy and it's making my
children happy as well. So I think:=
=I've found the same thing as well
Here Asha's happiness stems from the fact that s e has decided that it is up to her to change her
situation. By seeing herself as dependent and helpless, she was only making the whole family
unhappy. Rather, she states very strongly that we are all able to make our own decisions in life
and if we are unhappy with our situation, then it is for us to change it. Once she has come to this
realisation she is a happier person. The normal individual is one with a healthy autonomous and
independent focus. The incentive that encourages us to live up to the psychological norm is the
promise of happiness and liberation from past tro bles.
This is similar to Rose's (1990) argument that in the modern democratic state, individuals take
an active role in the shaping of their lives. They are self-monitoring and self-regulating, they
shape their own lives through the choices that they make and are thus responsible for their own
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happiness. By using the techniques offered to them by psychology, they are able to make the
changes to their selves that are necessary in order for them to reach happiness. In this way it is
possible for individuals to overcome this discrepancy between who they are and who they would
like to be.
What is not made as explicit as the reward for upholding the norm, is the 'punishment' for not
working towards it. This extract shows the conflict that is caused when individuals fail to live up
to this psychologically constructed norm. This extract is taken from the session on the cycle of
violence.
MARY: I find that strange because with everything I've read on abusive marriages, every
book, every article, they always say there's a phase where the husband or the
partner or whatever it is (Its not necessarily a marriage) always apologises and
tries to make up for it. I've never experienced that, never. My husband just sort of
lets things go and carry on as normal and never talk about it. There's never an
apology never sort of comes to me and says I'm terribly sorry, I'm going to make
it up to you or whatever.
Here again the normal family is constructed in tenns of the characteristics of the individuals that
comprise it. The normal way to deal with problems is to talk about them. Thus not only do
normal people work towards a psychological norm but normal relationships should also be
monitored and worked on. Here the problem stems from the fact that Mary's husband is unable to
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monitor himself sufficiently to recognise that he is contravening what is accepted, normal
behaviour. In addition he does not give the relationship the necessary work to make it nomlal. He
does not talk about problems the way that we are supposed to. Through being increasingly self-
monitoring, he would be able to recognise his problem and approach an expert on the self. The
experts educate the individual as to the reasons for their abnormal behaviour and provide them
with the teclmiques for regaining their normality as in the following extract.
FATIMA: You learn you've got to have help, I didn't know how to do it until I got referred
to the psychologist and she told me, I didn't know it was a problem, I didn't know
that was the problem I was suffering from. As I said I thought I was asthmatic.
That was the (.) She got me talking, about my life and my husband and I realised I
was being abused and I learned ho'w to deal with it. Now I was feeling the
symptoms coming on and I knew I needed help.
Here Fatima relates how she was diagnosed with depression. This extracts summarise quite
succinctly the themes touched on above. The lang age of psychology is pervasive in our society.
In Fatima's case, it was a doctor who helped her to define her problem as one, not stemming
from a medical problem, but of psychological origin. She was referred to the psychologist who
'taught' her what her problem was, thus liberating her from it. The problem is one that is defined
in psychological terms. She has to work on her self in order to reach normality once more. The
psychological cycle does not end with this, however. A large part of her therapeutic encounter
involved defining what her ideal self would be. She learns to continually monitor herself to
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ensure that she maintains this ideal even after the' therapy has ended. When she finds herself
lacking in any way, she now knows what it is that she needs in order to regain happiness. She
must consult the experts on the self.
This relates to what Foucault refers to as the inci' ement to discourse. He states that in our society,
we have developed procedures for confessing that which is most painful to admit (Foucault,
1979). Through our identification with discourses on domestic violence that reach us via diverse
technologies of the self, we are prompted to confess the ways in which we fail to live up to the
psychological norm. We are not forced by an external authority to talk about our failures of the
self but rather the incitement to discourse comes voluntarily from ourselves in an attempt to
reach fulfilment and happiness. Fatima's perceived abnormalities in her relationships incites her
to verbalise her problems.
Through describing oneself in therapy, the assumption is, therefore, that the expert can teach you
what you don't know about yourself. In the abov(~ example, Fatima did not know why she was
behaving in a manner that was incongruent with her usual self. In order to find out she had to
seek advice from a psychological expert who was able to relate back to her the parts of herself of
which she was not aware.
Women's Work
The category women is unproblematically used in much psychological discourse and its reality is
seldom questioned. Similarly, the above Rosean reading of the transcripts appears to be gender
blind. It relates to all individuals who exist in the modem democratic state and does not consider
the ways in which different categories of individuals may be addressed in different ways by this
pervasive psychological discourse. It is clear that there are times when the categorisation of
people into men and women is unquestionably useful. For example, the development of new
treatments for cervical cancer rest on a definition of 'woman' in terms of her biology. The result
of the categorisation is uncontroversially positive and allows for the improved health and at times
the saved lives of women. This does not mean that the category has always been used in a
positive manner, nor does it suggest that it can be unproblematically traced to an external reality.









And you think he's bringing that into your family now?
Absolutely. But you know I C.) before we got married I actually thought solved it
because we spoke about all this SOlt of thing and C.) he was dealing with it.
la.
And I don't know why I really thought that he was actually growing and that he
was going to get over it.
la.
And it's just got worse.
la.
My Mom said something interesting to me a while ago. She mentioned that she
thought the reason why things had got as bad as they have is possibly because I'm
the kind of person who likes to deal with a problem when the problem arises I like
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INGRlD:
to deal with it. I confront it. I really I really tackle it, and some people just don't
like doing that. They need to think about it for a while.
Some people battle with any confrontation.
Here Mary evaluates her husband's inability to talk about his problems. It seems that he lacks the
incitement to discourse (Foucault, 1979) that is associated with the construction of life's
problems in psychological terms. Mary is not only responsible for monitoring herself but her
whole family. She ensures that the psychological norms are being adhered to by the whole family
and that the values of psychology are instilled in its members. In her initial interview, she
expresses her frustration at her husband's unwillingness to handle problems the way that 'normal
adults' would. He not only lacks the incitement to talk about his problems but having consulted a
psychological expert on his problems he has failed to carry the lessons of therapy with him and
adjust himself through such techniques as required. Having found that he is lacking in
comparison to our social norms, it is Mary who is responsible for ensuring that the necessary




When I realised it's those simple little things, and I thought no there's definitely
something wrong here.
Mm.
And I said to him he must go to c:ounselling and he refused and refused and
refused and eventually it got really bad and things between us were quite chronic





And it DEFINITELY helped.
It is therefore the role of the woman in a relationship to provide the necessary evaluation of the
family, which leads to the search for help. She instils the desire to confess in the other members
of her family. This is not to suggest that her husband is not expected to live up to the norm of
being a self-monitoring, autonomous individual. Rather in the face of his failure to do so it is she
who is responsible for the management of the farnily self. That is, the emotional needs of the
family as a whole are monitored and satisfied through her. Wilbraham (1997) in discussing
discourses on monogamy states that it is the wife that is addressed by these discourses and it is
therefore she who is responsible for the "emotional housework" (p. 71). It is thus she who works
to save relationships and it is she who seeks ther py to this end. In these transcripts the wife not
only acts as 'sales representative' for psychological discourses, but she also plays the role of the
lay counsellor in the home if necessary. Later on in the interview Mary states that:
MARY:
INGRlD:
You know it was ALWAYS that. Always that sort of thing. And um it was really
getting me down and I thought, no I was going to talk to him about this because I
could see what was happening and I said to him I think this is happening, do you
think I'm right or wrong. And he said yes this is definitely the way he feels and
he'll disown his family - he wants nothing to do with them. And I said to him you






=because they do love you, but you've got to learn to say no to them. You know I
became like a counsellor in the whole issue. It was months before he started
dealing with it and I must say there was a big improvement. It was the first thing
that he, I think the only thing he really, really dealt with and actually=
=la. la.
You know now he can say if his Dimily are being unreasonable he'll say look I'm
sorry I don't have the time. I can't do it.
Mary not only helps her husband to confront his problems but through talking the issue over with
him helps him to identify his problem as one with his family of origin. The desired changes are
identified and she provides him with the techniques for reaching his desired state, that is,
learning to say 'no' to his family. The incentive for acting on his problem is the promise of








And if they need anything they COlne to me. They don't go to their father.
la.
They come to me. There's nothing that he's (.) he shares nothing in their lives.
So it sounds almost as if you're playing two roles. You're being mother and
father and=
Yes, yes that's true.





It is quite a strain because I don't have anybody that I can turn to. If I don't know
how to solve their problem I've got to ask somebody else for advice, like how
do I go about something, because lny husband doesn't know anything about
raising children. I caught my son smoking and er I told him - I said look David I
caught him (.) I watched him smoking, what do you think we should do about it?
Oh, leave him, leave him - he'll know, when he's going to start paying for his own
cigarettes he'll know how hard it is to smoke. Now is that the way you talk to your
son? So I took the matter into my own hands and I did talk to him and I said look
if you want to smoke, go and smoke as much as you want while I'm sitting here. I
want to see you smoke it. And he says - No Mommy I don't want to smoke. I said
- Do you know what cigarettes is about? Do you know what's nicotine? (.) My
husband doesn't smoke and he doesn't drink (.) so that's one good side of him as
well. And er he (.) I didn't hit hiIn, because usually if I was in that position I
\vould have murdered him - almost murdered him - and er I sat and spoke to
him. I told him - look if there is anything you want of me, come and ask me first.
Mommy is strong. It can be anything. Feel free to talk to me. If it's not right I'll
tell you that it's not right, but it's your choice. You're an individual. You've
got to make your own choice.
Mm(.) .Mm=
But I'm not going to MAKE you do something you don't want to do. You going
to do whatever you want to do eventually. It's going hide and do it. But I'm telling
how bad the cigarettes are going to affect him.
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Firstly, Asha is quick to admit that she would consult an expert should she feel the problem is out
of her hands. She is not the expert on the topic but she does have some psychological skills.
Through talking with her son, they construct the norms according to which his behaviour is
measured together. He is also constructed as a free, autonomous individual who has to make his
own choices. Her role is to provide him with the objective facts on the matter, that is, the effects
of nicotine on his health. In other words, he is able to decide for himself whether he wants to
smoke or not but his choice will always be made in relation to the norm constructed in their
therapeutic encounter. It is significant that her new approach to dealing with the identity needs of
her family has changed since her own encounter \vith psychology. She is handling her family's
needs in a more acceptable manner, that is, in psychological terms. Clearly one would not want
to suggest that her prior violent approach would be preferable but rather it is essential that we
recognise that the psychological approach taken is not the only alternative. She could, for
example, have explained that smoking is wrong because it contradicts religious teachings.
The extract shows how she encourages her son to talk to her about his problems. She is
responsible for instilling the incitement to discourse in him. He is encouraged to talk about any
problems he has. Asha offers herself as the therapist for the family.
In both of the above examples, therefore, we can see that the woman, in her capacity as mother
and wife takes on the role in the family that the psychological expert has in society. Women can
be seen to carry the responsibility for instilling the psy-complex in the family as a whole. She
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monitors all members in terms of the psychological norm whilst at the same time instilling the
values of psychology. In other words, she teaches her children and encourages her husband to
become self-monitoring. When they fail to do so she consults the experts on the self. When
family men1bers do perceive lack, she is available for confession. It is this confession that results
in the members of the family being freed of their past inadequacies and becoming increasingly
self-determined individuals whose normality is closely monitored. As they grow up, they should
ideally require her less and less and soon they will consult the experts for themselves upon
perceiving their selves to be inadequate. In this ~'ay, the mother acts as a relay to ensure that the
values and norms of psychology are instilled in individuals thus increasing the pervasivness of
the discipline. 'Women's work' can be seen to have two aspects to it. Firstly, the woman is
responsible for ensuring that the members of the family are working on themselves. She instils
the values of the psychological entrepreneur in the members of her family. Secondly, she is
responsible for hearing the family's confessions. She can, therefore, be seen as the manager of
the psychological selves within the family.
The rationale stated in therapy for getting women to work on their selves and their families'
selves is their own empowerment. What is not considered is the options that are abnorrnalised
through the construction of a psychological norrn. Drawing on the work of Wilbraham (1997)
we can suggest that the options which may be abnormalised are ones that undermine the sanctity
of the family. They may include the woman simply leaving the relationship with a sigh of relief,
or pursuing an extra-marital affair. In presenting the norms of the self through therapy it is
essential that the counsellor be aware of the historical context out of which such norms emerge.
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Some Conclusions
Increasingly, domestic violence is constructed as a problem of sel~. The theory on domestic
violence takes as its starting point an assumption that people are self monitoring, autonomous
individuals who evaluate themselves in terms of the psychological norm. What remains to be
explored are the political implications of this focus on subjectivity. We have already seen that the
transmission and reproduction of psychological norms and values identifies a particular role for
women and as such rests heavily on the reproduction of gender categories. I intend to extend this
argument to show that power over and power to are not incompatible notions that require debate
to ensure that one does not undermine the existence of the other. Rather, I will look at how
psychology plays a role in the encouragement of ower to through the reduction of power over.
Some feminists have debated the value of the Foucauldian notion of power for women (Poovey,
1995; Lloyd, 1993). Lloyd (1993) sees his 'micro-physical' focus on power as problematic
because it is unable to account for the systematic power imbalances between men and women as
social groups. In other words, it is unable to account for why men as a group abuse women as a
group. Lloyd (1993) also states that it is unable to account for the ways in which power is
organised to ensure that practises such as domestic violence can continue given its view of power
as a dispersed network. She states that through the rejection of the feminist universals and the
'macrophysical' way in which power manifests itself, the genderedness of power is ignored
(Lloyd, 1993, p.438). Along a similar line, Hartsock (1990) states that Foucault's view of power
as having no site, location or presence means that feminism lacks a unifying focus for political
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action. Different authors have come to different conclusions about what should be done about
this conflict of interests. Hartsock believes that it should lead to the rejection of poststructuralism
by feminism. I would however follow the argument of Einstein (in Lloyd, 1993) that the
difference, discontinuity and diversity of Foucault's understanding can be integrated into and
complimented by the feminist understanding of the genderedness of power. That is, by looking at
the interrelationship between the two notions of power a feminist agenda can be advanced.
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CHAPTER SIX
POWER: KEEPING TIlE HEART BEATING
Having illustrated that understandings of domestic violence have been saturated with the psy-
complex and that this has been instrumental in constructing it as a problem of self, the question
to be answered is, what are the consequences of such a construction. We have already seen that
psychological discourse ensures its transmission through the reinforcement of the gender
categories that justify men and women having different psychological jobs. Here I shall consider
in more detail the nature of the power that the psy-complex wields. I would also like to
emphasise that domestic violence is an example of legitimate and demanded State intervention
into the family. We thus require a theory of both the manifest and the latent ways in which power
is present.
'Power Over': The Arteries Of Power
The starting assumption here is that domestic violence is about power but that this power can
manifest itself in different ways. This chapter airns to identify the different kinds of power that
are present in the way the women understand their experiences and to look at how these interact.
I hope to show that 'microphysical' and 'macrophysical' power work hand in hand to ensure the
reproduction of a particular notion of subjectivity. In addition, both of these understandings of
power rest on the assumption that gender categories exist in reality. It is therefore necessary to
critique our understanding of gender categories whilst at the same time maintaining a focus on
the effects that they have on the everyday lives of women given that they have been treated as
real.
Consider the following extract that was taken frorn a preliminary interview with Krishne.
KRlSHNE: At the moment it's fine, but why I came here is because two months ago I had a
very serious problem. My husband. was drinking excessively. He was coming
home and beating me and er I actually had two assault cases (.) No, (.) one
attempted murder and one assault case. (sighs))
INGRlD: la. la.
KRlSHNE: Because urn he just beat me up and you know he didn't even think - he just left
me to lie in gutter. He didn't urn (2) after he hit me he was acting very er like he
didn't feel sorry about it you knovl =
INGRlD: =Mm (.) Mm (.)=
KRlSHNE: =and he didn't apologise and er anyway I got a Court Interdict for him and I got
him out of the house and er like er basically I used to live in fear because I never
know what he's going to do. And er before he already assaulted me, I er used to
run away like er on the days I know he's going to cause a problem.
Clearly in this extract, Krishne's husband has power over her based on his physical strength. She
has no power in the relationship. Feminist focuse:s have been on increasing this kind of power for
women in relationships. The success of such attempts can be seen in the fact that she is now able
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to have him removed from the house. Before the Prevention of Family Violence Act (no 133 of
1993) this would not have been possible and she v/ould have had to leave if she were in physical
danger. Rose states that State intervention into the family has become increasingly illegitimate
except in cases where there is clear harm being done. Domestic violence is a clear example of
one such case. Here Krishne is able to appeal to State power, which is another clear example of
power over. Her husband can be arrested and she can obtain an interdict (as stated in the
Prevention of Family Violence act, 133 of 1993). In this sense the law can be seen to act in her
defence to give her some degree of power over. It is at this macrophysicallevel of power that
feminism has focused (Lloyd, 1996).
I have already suggested that feminism's ackno\vledgement of power relations represents its
major shift from the mainstream understandings of domestic violence as outlined in chapter two.
Although this notion of power has come under critique recently, it is one still relevant to the
study of domestic violence. In the view of feminism, power is seen to work from the top, that is,
it is juridico-discursive (Foucault, 1979). Power is exercised by an authority (Krishne's husband,
the law etc.) over the person with less power (Krishne in the case of her husband and her husband
in the case of the law). Changes to the system, from this perspective, need to be made to laws,
schools, communities and other institutions via their leaders. Following the feminist tradition,
much of the lobbying around domestic violence called for changes to be made to the Prevention
of Family Violence Act (133 of 1993). This has been to increase women's power over men and
thus balance the scales in some way. Some theorists such as Foucault (1979) have, however,
debated that this kind of power even exists. I would suggest that in the area of domestic violence
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there are changes which need to be made at this level, given that many of our laws, schools and
other institutions directly obstruct the prevention of violence against women.
I have argued that the psy-complex is powerful and that its power is based, to some extent, on
gender categories. In other words, women are given a unique role in the transmission of the psy-
complex. Although some authors (Riley, 1988) t at the category 'women' is a myth, I argue that
although this may be the case, as a historical construction, this category is very real because these
sources of power have treated it as real. In other words, through treating the category 'women' as
,
real, psychology has been able to use this category to ensure the reproduction of a particular
notion of subjectivity thus reinforcing women as being the partner responsible for the work on
the relationship in terms of psychological norms. We thus require an of analysis of power that
can explain the systematic oppression of women by men and the institutions that reflect male
interests. It is, therefore, worth considering in more detail the nature of this power as feminism as
typically viewed it. Consider the following example:
KRISHNE: Er no I take anything and I throw i.t at him when he wants to hit me, or like urn I
threatened him a few times and I told him that he ifhe comes home and he's
going to hit me or anything like that. Because see that last time he took a knife
and er hit me with beer bottles on the head. And er I'm just not sure what he's








KRISHNE: =and he's quite a big size, you know tall guy and all (.) And er I told him that (.) I
was actually boiling water one day and I told him ifhe's comes over I'll bum him
with it. And (.) er I think with all that threatening he really appreciates not to hurt
me.
laja
=And with those charges and you know
la. ja. So (3)
=we lock him up and all that. I think I'm really pleased with that you know. I
don't think he'll ever hit me again.
So it sounds like you are kind of regaining some kind of power over him or
control?
KRISHNE: Power ja, and control ja that's hovv I feel=
INGRID: =over the situation?
KRISHNE: He's afraid actually even to be verbally abusive to me.
INGRID: Mm. Mm.
KRISHNE: He's just a thing and he's quiet, because he knows that er (.) even ifhe's going to
abuse me and all or be physically abusive that he's going to be locked up.
Foucault (1979) suggests that juridico-discursive power is first and foremost a negative form of
power. In other words, it is based on rejection, refusal, concealment and exclusion. It says 'no'
and creates lack. Here Krishne notes the ways in 'which the law has helped her to become more
powerful in a relationship that she previously had no power in. She is able to reject her husband's
power over her. With the help of the State's power his actions towards her are limited. Power
over thus sets up a system based on 'saying no'; it tells people what they mayor may not do. It is
a law of prohibition that works primarily through the threat of punishment. Her husband may not
physically beat her. The ability to disallow this behaviour rests on the power of the law to say no
by intervening in cases of clear or extreme harm. What is beginning to be evident is that power
from this perspective, would place domestic violence in a system of binary oppositions
(powerful/powerless, man/woman etc.). It must be analysed in terms of these binaries and the
laws and institutions that serve to maintain it.
I have called power over the arteries of power because they are the most obvious kinds of power.
They exist in all the institutions in which we live and work and are the direct and obvious forms
of power that lead into patriarchy. As arteries purnp blood away from the heart, so power over
transmits the values and norms of patriarchy and implements them in society. They carry with
them assumptions about men and women and the roles that they are equipped to play in society.
They can be seen to be evident in domestic violence to the extent that the masculine and violent
norms of patriarchy are transmitted into the family.
Feminism has been instrumental in exposing the irregularities and unethical practices of existing
power structures that have a direct influence on domestic violence. An example would be the
attempt to expose sexist attitudes and stereotypes that uphold unequal power relations within the
family as feminist responses to mainstream theory on domestic violence have done. The feminist
~esponses to mainstream theory have tried to sho'w how it is that such structures can be free from
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these inequalities. For example, therapy allows for the sexist attitudes of men to be exposed and
the therapist shows the abuser how it is that family power relations can become more egalitarian.
This attempt at a new and gender free power has not, however, been limited to an analysis of the
power relations within the family but has been extended to all institutions which impact in some
way on domestic violence. Feminist theory on dOlnestic violence has thus been useful in
recognising that power relations do not simply exist within the family or the legal institutions but
in all the social areas into which we enter as individuals including schools, personal
relationships, and so on. Its critique has, however, remained within this juridico-discursive
framework. The characteristics and manifestations of power are taken to be the same in all
institutions whether we are analysing the family or the state. It is seen as the top-down, and
prohibiting power discussed above. As a result, feminism has failed to problematise the system
of binary oppositions upon which its analysis of power is based. It has identified the pervasivness
of patriarchy and the ways in which it manifests itself but has, as its solution, offered a power
free society. In so doing it has been able to consider feminist approaches to be free from power
relations. Rather, I would suggest that this simply allows the power relations within the feminist
framework to go undetected. We need to look at the extent to which a feminist therapy is as
powerful as other therapies and critique the assumptions and categories that it takes for granted in
order to expose this power.
'Power To': The Capillaries Of Power
Rose states that State intervention into the family has become increasingly illegitimate due to the
critiques that have arisen of the welfare State (Rose, 1990). He states that the damage that the
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welfare state has on occasions done fails to justify its wide reaching intrusions into areas
considered private. Although State intervention in cases of extreme violence has been demanded,
this power to intervene is limited. The state is only able to intervene where there is a clear
example of power over. Where there are clear arteries of power the State has at its disposal the
means to combat such power. Where this is the case it can intervene to increase the power of the
powerless and 'balance the playing field'. When this is not the case, it is assumed that the State is
not required. What I would suggest is that feeding into the arteries of power are capillaries of
power that reinforce the norms and values of patriarchy but are less easily identified. This is







I've tried threatening him with the police but what am I going to threatening him
with the police for? I didn't call the police because he never hurt me or abused me
in any way that (.) You understand what I'm trying to say =
=Ja there's nothing =
=So there was nothing that I could actually call the police. (.) says go ahead and
call them (.) What our neighbours can do?
Yes=
=So that was no help for me either, but I don't know (.) I think what is gong to
open his eyes, I really don't know.
I know for a fact that she even told me that if I have to go to Court, she will stand
in Court and tell them the abuse that I am suffering from my husband - that she









And there was a day when I went over there and told her - there's the house key,
I've had enough. This is it. I'm not going back, but I don't want my husband to go
and stand in the street and see ho\v his wife is not there. There's the key. PLEASE
give it to him.
Ja.
She was very angry. She was (.) that's the day she told me that no let's go to the
police station and charge this man. And I said - What are we going to charge him
for? There is no way, I mean what is there to charge him for. There's no way that
he's doing anything illegal (.)
Ja. Ja=
=01' even ifhe's smoking drugs or something, taking (.) then I can say no he's
doing these things under the influence of drugs and liquor or whatever.
Here Asha expresses her frustration at having no way of improving her power over her husband
given that he has not been physically violent towards her. State intervention into this case would
be illegitimate as it is not a sufficiently extreme situation to warrant it. The problem is
constructed not as one of violence or threat of physical harm but of self. The State has no
expertise on the self and is thus helpless in this situation. Consider the following extract. This







You've got a very valid point, because there's something I want to add to what
you have just said. As with your life I accepted the fact that's the way my husband
is, but I needed help and I came here. I learned something, I think, for the first
time in my life for many, many ye:ars I'm really happy. I'm not putting on a show
to say I'm smiling, it's great. I am really happy. The thing is I sat down and I
thought about everybody and thei problems and my problems. We have a right to
change our positions. There's no such thing as we cannot change it. But what we
can - what we DON'T want to change it's our decision. As I said I didn't want to
change my position, but I was also making my husband unhappy. Although I
didn't want to change this position that I am in I know for a fact, er because I have
been here also, a couple of weeks - three weeks I think I have been=
=Mm.Mm.
= and I've become more like the person I used to be before I married him, and I
can see my husband is happy as \\Tell. It's making me happy and it's making my
children happy as well. So I think=
I've found the same thing as well
Yes. And what you actually - what I've actually learned is that I don't want to
change my situation, but I was making it more of a problem than helping it. And
by me showing them that I am happy, whole altogether, actually happy, really
meaning it, I am happy, my husband is happy and my children are happy. So I
mean I am human. There are going to be times when I'm going to feel I need










this. I mean, I've learned, I know it's only about three or four times that we've
been here but that's the kind of help I got already. So maybe by the end of the
session I maybe even happier. So you have very point.
It's strange. You moved through the (.) I mean it's eventually you get to a point
where you just can't cry about it anymore. You have no more tears=
=and then what you actually, what I weighed our, the good sides of our marriage,
what we have gained out of it and you know like I put myself in your situation.
You have a terrible situation. Well like your husband how he has. My husband put
me through emotionally. But like I say you asked for help early. Hopefully you
will be able to understand your husband how I am learning. I think is the
second stage now that I'm learning. From the psychologist I learned to find my
mistakes. From here I've learn~~d to be happy and I've learned that if want
to change something I can change it, but if I don't want to change it I've got
to make, MAKE it work for us.
la. la.
And I think it's better. We living in much=
=The decision really is yours=
It's is. It's mine.
=and it's amazing how once you've made the decision it's such a relief almost.
Yes. It's nice. It's a nice feeling. So Mary is right to have that problem. Think




ASHA: So she's quite right.
((Child screaming))
SUE: They think violence is a (.) method of problem solving. Many of them feel that
that's the way to solve the problenl because they don't know how else to do it. Do
you find that?
KRISHNE: I do, because my husband is unable to talk. He feels like he must be violent, you
know, to get the nlessage across. And urn it's very confusing, because er even
though he's violent he's when he's drunk he wants to talk about everything. But
when he's sober he's just really quiet. I mean as much as I try to talk, he's just
quiet. Like urn everyone around us, our neighbours, they all feel like he's such a
saint, because you don't hear him shouting or something and I sort of get these
temper tantrums and I start to scream at him, so everyone says - oh because she's
shouting and screaming and everything and she' s=
What is interesting about this extract is the way that it progresses. The previous week, Asha had
been expressing her disillusionment with her relationship and doubting that she could continue in
it. Here she returns to the advice of her previous psychologist and she changes herself and her
attitude to the relationship. She learns to manage her relationship not through obtaining increased
power over her husband as this not really possible given that there is no blatant form of abuse.
Rather, through her encounter with psychology she learns that she can change her husband
through changing herself. It is she who has the power to alter the mood in the family through the
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way in which she conducts herself. In this way the cycle is reproduced in which she becomes
increasingly self-monitoring. She also monitors the kinds of changes that occur in the family as
she alters her self. Through psychology, she learns to rely less on power over. She no longer acts
violently or aggressively. Rather she monitors herself and makes changes in order to affect the
whole family. The woman is once again responsible for the 'emotional housework' (Wilbraham,
1997). She is taught the appropriate ways for her to exercise povver and this is through her own
self management. In addition, due to the psychologisation of the problem, that is, its description
in terms of the self, the inappropriateness of the power over that the women's husbands' use is
identified. This is not the correct way to deal with problems. Rather they should be dealt with
through self-monitoring and self-management. Their husbands have failed to reach the
psychological norm as they have not constructed problems in terms of the self and have therefore
failed to use the appropriate methods (power to) to change the situation.
Power to is, therefore, constructed as the appropriate way for a woman to increase her power in a
relationship. In addition, however, it is also the method employed by those offering expertise on
the self to encourage and mould women's power strategies. The above extract describes how,
through therapy, Asha learns a better way to handle the problems she is experiencing with her
husband. Psychology thus has the power to influence the choice of action that an individual
takes. When she forgets that it is power to and not power over that she should be using (as she
will because, as she says, she is only human) she returns to the psychologist to have these lessons
reinforced.
1O~)
Again, this argument is one that is related to the work of Foucault (1979) who suggests that
increasingly, there is a new kind of power emerging coupled with a gradual and consistent move
away from the notions of power stemming from the middle ages a.s described above (that is, what
I have termed power over). The operation of these new forms of power "is not ensured by right
but by technique, not by law but by normalisation, not by punishment but by control, methods
that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus" (Foucault,
1979, p. 89). He goes on to argue that one cannot examine power's existence from a central,
sovereign point with secondary forms radiating out from this point. Rather, power is a force that
is "local and unstable" (p. 93). Rather than being an institution or a structure, power is produced
from one moment to the next and it comes from everywhere. It is "the multiplicity of force
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own
organisation; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms,
strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus
forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate
them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general
design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the
law, in the various social hegemonies" (Foucault, 1979, p. 93).
Power is thus not something that someone has as would be the case in power over, but rather is
something that is exercised through the interplay of unequal, dynamic relations. In addition,
power relations are evident in all relations and art:~ the conditions of division and inequality. They
are not therefore prohibitive but are rather productive. It has already been shown that they are
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able to produce emotional work as women's work. In this way, power can be said to come from
below. There exists no binary opposition between the rulers and the ruled. Rather than the power
relations in a family being a reflection of the po\\-'er relations that exist in society, they are the
t
basis for social inequality as a whole. These small scale inequalities are, however, ambiguous.
Women are given a degree of power in that they are able to manage families. Giving power at
this level ensures, however, that it can be withheld at a grand level. Large scale domination can
be explained as an effect of these smaller scale inequalities and is sustained by them. This makes
the feminist analysis of power somewhat problernatic. As I have argued previously, there is a
need to consider the large scale domination of women by men. However, if such large scale
domination is maintained by smaller scale power relations such as those in the family, the
feminist goal of questioning gender inequality in the family would be vital. Its attempts to replace
these unequal relations with egalitarian ones is somewhat more problematic if we accept that
power is everywhere and is inescapable. In counselling men and women who are in abusive
relationships we would, in addition to this critique of the power inequality in society, require a
critique of the power inequality in the therapeutic relationship and the history behind our
demands for change. We need to consider what it is that we are assuming to be true of men and
women and where these assumptions have developed from.
Like the feminist notion of power, Foucault's notion of power sees it as being based on the
ultimate achievement of a set of aims and objectives. These aims and objectives needn't,
however, arise from the choice of someone with that power. Rather, power is manifested as a set
of tactics that, through propagating one another, find support in other areas. The aims are thus
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clear, but it is not possible to say that they are the aims put forward by anyone person. No one
person tells women that they need to adjust their selves in order to increase their power in
relationships. Linked to this, resistance doesn't take the form of single revolutionary movements
as seen in feminism but rather, there are multiple points of resistance within this power network.
She resists her husband's power by refusing to be unhappy and by learning how to make the
relationship work. This gives an explanation of the existence of multiple Feminisms which, as I
have attempted to show in the discussion of binary oppositions, operate within the existing power
framework which has a specific historical construction. So what then of women's systematic
oppression? Foucault suggests that it is more likely that there are ever changing points of
resistance which create divisions that are dynamic and fluid both within individuals and between
groups. It is this kind of oppression that is more likely that large scale binary divisions. Rather
than consider what form of power is the most likely, I am concerned here with a consideration of
how these two notions of power are mutually reinforcing and the different ways in which power
operates when dealing with domestic violence specifically.
Thus psychology's power to construct the subjectivities of its clients does not come from a
sovereign authority or from a clearly identifiable place in our society. It comes from the power
that it has in the interactions between people. Women are constructed as the member of the
family responsible for doing the emotional labour through the interactions between people in
support groups and the contact people have with discourses on the self. These discourses do not,
however, contradict our social norms, as has been suggested in earlier chapters. Rather they act to
reinforce existing norms by giving people choices within these values and constructing them as
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free, autonomous individuals. In this way, these' capillaries' of power can be seen to feed into
the arteries of power. It is the capillaries that make the existence of arteries possible. They
construct people to understand themselves in particular ways that justify the existence of
institutions to reinforce this construction. For example, by constructing men and women as
having different roles in the relationship and by constructing emotional work as women's work,
structures, such as support groups, can be set up that target women as their clients without
causing controversy. This appears both natural and unproblematic as, it is women to whom these
services would naturally appeal.
Conclusion
What would be required then would be a theoretical perspective that allows us to be critical of
the very categories on which our understanding of the phenomenon is based. Here the
transmission of the 'technologies of the self relies heavily on the category 'women'. Riley
(1988) claims that the category 'women' is historically constructed relative to other categories
which themselves also fluctuate. "'Women' is a volatile collectively in which female persons can
be very differently positioned, so that the apparent continuity of the subject 'women' isn't to be
relied on" (p. 2) These are ideas which initially appear contradictory to the aims of feminism. If
we want to produce a feminist critique of the ways in which women are seen as being responsible
for 'emotional housework' in a relationship we need to argue that this is simply a myth about
women. It is not the notion that women exist that is problematic, but the stereotypes associated
with it that allow for unequal power relations within relationships. Riley (1988) continues by
stating that"....Yet it must be emphasised that these instabilities of the category are the sine qua
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non of feminism, which would otherwise be lost for an object, despoiled of a fight, and, in short,
without much life" (1988, p. 2). This does explain the feminist resistance to the poststructuralist
movement in psychology. She goes on to argue, however that feminists can safely welcome the
inconsistency of the category 'women'. She makl~s the bold statement that there are no women
and that all gender categories must be looked on critically. It is this scrutiny that is the
appropriate subject matter for feminism. She cautions, however, that our queries into our sexual
categorisation should not ride roughshod over the harshness of our lived gender. It is this point
which I wish to emphasise. Feminist theory is useful in its analysis of gender the way it has been
constructed in our society, as it is this gender which has been the basis for policy, and other
social practices which subordinate the interests of 'women' to those of 'men'. As in the above
analysis, the notion women can be considered very real in that it allows psychology to address
'women' as a group of people in a different way to the ways in which men are addressed. There
is, therefore, use in treating women as an existing and real category in analysing the ways in
which it has been used to achieve very particular ends in our society. What is lacking on the
whole from the feminist analysis of domestic violence, however, is an analysis of the artificiality
of these constructions. Ultimately, a feminist reading of domestic violence and its construction in
psychological terms should aim for the poststructuralist goal of a post-gendered identity.
Riley suggests that "The precise specifying of 'women' for feminism might well mean
occasionally forgetting them - or remembering them more accurately by refusing to enter into the
terms of some public invocation. At times feminism might have nothing to say on the subject of
'women' - when their excessive identification would swallow any opposition, engulfing it
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hopelessly" (1988, p. 4). She thus sees a new feminism, one that is reflexive, and critical of the
gender categories that we take for granted. She suggests that there are not only two options for
feminism, namely a realism that tolerates no uncertainty surround~ng the category women, and a
deconstructionist theory that has no political aims. Rather we can use the category 'women' with
an awareness of its historical construction at times when its use would further benefit our
political goals. It should be the place of feminism to debate such aspects of categorisation. It is
this point which needs to be reinforced in the way psychological discourses address women. It is
a category that can be used to the benefit of its su~jects. It is also a category that can be seen as
historically constructed to serve ideological goals. The above analysis shows the role of
psychology in reproducing a gendered subjectivity that ensures the effective permeation of
psychological norms into society.
To demonstrate the fluidity of the category of 'women' Riley (1988) traces its history over time.
She notes how it has become increasingly sexualised and how the development of the social
sciences have resulted in the modem notion of 'women' through their studies. She suggests that
"it was not so much that women were omitted, as that they were too thoroughly included in an
asymmetrical manner" (Riley, 1988, p. 15). This is clear in considering the ways in which
psychological discourses on domestic violence have addressed women, to a great extent but in a
manner that awards them a different role in the relationship to men. Through therapy, women
could, for example be encouraged to become active in examining, rejecting or redefining these
constructions of 'women'. Foucault claimed that we should aim to dissipate our identities rather
than to uncover their roots. The question that remains is what can feminism do with this kind of a
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subjectivity? The feminist fear that this fluidity in subjectivity would result in a post-gendered
being which would dilute the feminist aims and strengthen the powers of those that subordinate
women is a realistic one but it is not the only possibility. A recognition of the historical nature of
gender is unlikely to melt away gender divisions or antagonisms. The most feminism could hope
for is a temporary and brief understanding of domestic violence with a critical awareness of the
assumptions that underlie this understanding.
The question that feminists should welcome then is how it is that people come over time to be
collected under the banner of 'men' and 'women'? Riley (1988) argues convincingly that the aim
should not be to validate these categories, nor to e tirely refute them but rather to demonstrate
their temporality and the manner in which they have been defined historically and in relation to
other categories. The author is thus not calling for a new feminism without 'women' but
suggests that there are valuable ways in which the category women has been employed (for
example in the development of cervical cancer treatments). Feminists should, however, maintain
an awareness of the instability of this category.
Along a similar line, Haraway (1990) denies that vve need a unified experience in order to rally
for women. Rather than our politics being based on a notion of the innocent subject under a
hierarchy of oppressions with a moral superiority and a closeness to nature, we should base our
politics on the realisation that we are fully implica.ted in the world. This is compatible with the
Foucauldian notion of the body as an effect. That is, the female body becomes so only under a
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particular 'gaze'. There is no essential characteristic of a woman's body that precedes her being
grouped with other 'women'.
Thus, whilst the category 'women' should not be entirely disregarded, we must remain aware that
a self-representing or independent femininity remains an ideal. The increasing sexualisation of
women's bodies is rooted in a language that has become indoctrinated. One could suggest (in a
moment of extremity) that feminism will eventually fade with the realisation of the post-
gendered subjectivity but, this is not, from my perspective, always desirable and there are times
when 'Ne will want to maintain the category 'women'. I suggest rather that we must seek to break
this bond of binary opposition by locating our debates and struggles as feminists in the area of
social and personal identity in an attempt to uncover the constructed nature of such an identity.
This could allow for the potential undoing of these identities as opposed to their reversal. At
worst the category could be minimised and women could become less saturated in their sex and
could at times distance themselves from the category whilst at other times identifying with it. As
Riley (1989) states, "if feminism is the voicing of 'women' from the side of 'women', then it
cannot but act out the full ambiguities of the category. This reflection reduces some of the sting





This thesis develops the argument by Rose (1985) that social misconduct has increasingly been
explained in psychological terms. This psychologisation of social misconduct, of which domestic
violence is an example, is referred to in this thesis as the psy-complex. The psy-complex rests on
a very specific understanding of the subject of psychology and this understanding is evident in
the discourses of domestic violence. The self as constructed through the literature on domestic
violence is the rational, autonomous individual who is responsible for his/her own decisions and
choices. We are constructed as 'psychological ent epreneurs' that work on our selves and manage
them of our own free will. This understanding of the self has been seen as natural rather than
historically constructed and as a result it has escaped scrutiny and critique.
An analysis of the subjectivity that psychological theories of domestic violence assumes reveals
it to be a gendered construction. In therapeutic encounters, women are assigned a specific role in
the family as the managers of the selves of the family. The psy-complex therefore has two
effects. It is firstly capable of making people see their deviant behaviour in psychological terms
which leads them to work on their selves should they perceive them to be lacking. More than
this, however, it assigns women the role of monitoring the members of the family and ensuring
that the selves of all members are in keeping with the psychological norm. The transmission of
the values of psychology into the family is constructed as 'womens work'. As a result, it is she
who instils in family members the incitement to discourse. In other words, when a member of the
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family perceives himself/herself to be behaving in a manner that deviates from the norm, it is the
wife and mother who he/she confesses to.
Power in domestic violence can be said to exist at two levels. The first and most obvious form of 1
po\tver is power over. This is compatible with the feminist understanding of power and is easily.-J
identifiable. This is a form of power that requires ongoing scrutiny as domestic violence is a clear
example of this power over. There are, however, other forms of power that feminism has failed to
acknowledge given its focus on the systematic inequalities between men and women. This is
what I have termed power to. Power to refers to the power of the psy-complex. The
psychologisation of deviant behaviour such as violence means that people are encouraged to
monitor and govern themselves. Women are 'taught' through psychological discourses that
power to is the appropriate method for the management of their problems. In other words they
learn that if they want to change conditions within their marriages, they must adjust themselves
rather than demanding changes from others. They must work on their own subjectivity to achieve
happy relationships. As we have seen, however, this message is especially strong for women as
they are the ones who are expected to work on the selves of all family members.
For a more critical theory and practise, what is required is a critique of the ways in which
psychological discourses have unquestioningly accepted the category women. Discourses are able
to address women without being considered political as the roles for women and men are
considered natural rather than historically constructed. A goal of feminism could be a
deconstruction of the gender categories and the way that they allow the psy-complex to address
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men and women differentially.
In this way we see that the notion of power over and power to are .both notions that can be
accepted by feminist theory. An analysis of the capillaries of power does not require us to dismiss
systematic power differences between men and women. Rather we can choose when it serves
feminist agendas to use the category women and vvhen it would best serve our purposes to reveal
its constructed nature.
Critiques Of This Thesis
General Process Criticisms
Brydon-Miller (1997) states that traditionally we ave been told that "you can't mix your politics
and your psychology". From a feminist perspective, it is not only impossible to separate politics
and psychology but it is undesirable. Research can and should, therefore, be done for political
reasons. This does not mean, however, that this is an easy approach to take. In the conclusion of
this thesis I suggest that therapy could benefit from a critique of the ways in which it is
instrumental in the transmission of the psy-complex and though this its construction of a
gendered subjectivity. This is a strong political belief of mine. Given that I was studying the
group that I was also facilitating, I did not raise such criticisms as I felt that it may jeopardise the
quality of the data that I obtained. I was on the whole very quiet during the groups in my efforts
to get at the women's understandings of their experiences. In this sense I could be criticised for
withholding critiques that could have helped women to question their roles in the family. I was
tom between the desire to confront them on this and challenge their accepted subjectivity, and the
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need to obtain my data. My silence on this topic may have meant that I did not offer all that I
could have to the women in the group as they could have benefited from being challenged on
their understandings of subjectivity. This could, however, be justified on the basis that having
obtained this data, the research can be used to infl ence therapeutic skills and psychological
discourse on a broader level. This leads me to the second challenge of the research.
What Happens To This Research?
If the critique of subjectivity was not offered, then this research would have to be put to practical
use for women. It is not sufficient for it to remain in the form of a masters thesis. More than this,
the thesis will have to be published in a form and place that makes it accessible to women and
ensures that they derive benefit from it; either directly or indirectly through their contact with
therapy. Leaving the thesis in a theoretical and sornewhat abstract form denies women access to
it. This is a critique that feminists have raised against much mainstream theory. Ramazanoglu
(1993) relates her early experiences of the emergence of postmodernism into women's groups.
She writes:
I arrived late at a women's meeting towards the end of the annual conference of the
British Sociological Association a few years ago, to find some women expressing
indignation at finding session after session of the conference dominated by men talking in
terms of 'postmodernism'. These women said they felt silenced, intimidated, excluded,
put down and angry. They did not know wether 'postmodernism' was something they
should take seriously, because they could not engage with a debate which made the
issues inaccessible to them....the general ideas of thought which have been defined (in
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various ways) as postmodernist and poststructuralist are, (however) the intellectual
context of Foucault's work. Much of the \vork in this area has been characterised by
intellectual elitism, and a level of abstraction from experience which makes it far
removed from most English-speaking feminist work. This has turned discussion of the
wider relevance Foucault's thought into a demanding academic specialism which has had
little impact on feminism outside academiC circles. In discussions of Foucault, those most
sympathetic to his work tend to disappear into high terminology (Ramazanoglu, 1993, p.
1).
Although this thesis has argued the relevance of Foucault's work and, more generally,
poststructuralism for feminism, the feelings she relates are ones that must be taken seriously.
Given that many women have been excluded from academic institutions, this research has the
potential to be of little use to them. It is therefore essential that any publication of the thesis
reaches those working 'on the ground'. It is also essential that the findings be fed back to both
Famsa and the women from the group so that they can air any views that they may have on the
debates raised.
The Quality Of The Research
Given that qualitative research lacks a set of strict procedures or rules, it is difficult to evaluate
how good a study is as no one set of evaluation criteria can be used. I have chosen to judge the
quality of this research (very loosely) on a number of questions that Miles and Huberman (1984)
identify as useful. Firstly, on the basis of the methodology, one must ask whether the study is
replicable. Have researcher biases been identified and would another researcher be able to carry
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out the same study and reach similar conclusions? Secondly, is the setting, time scale, design,
questions posed, and method of analysis appropriate for the aims and objectives of the research?
Does the research make sense? Good research findings should be coherent and rival hypotheses
should have been considered. In assessing the transferability of the study, one could ask whether
it describes the sample adequately and whether the scope and boundaries of the research are
identified. Can the theory be transferred to other studies and have the findings been tested in
other studies? What these questions suggest is that good qualitative research should have
practical usefulness. One could, therefore, ask how much of the study is practically useful and
what actions should come of the research. It should to some extent solve a problem. Through the
research process, these questions have been posed and asked in order to ensure that the study
meet the requirements of 'good' research.
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